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change has come with a potential political cost.
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of  decentralisation processes in support of  local participation and inclusion, 
it also suggests that new approaches to capacity building are needed if  
decentralisation is to be successfully deepened. ‘Place’ may be becoming less 
important than before as Bangladesh becomes more urban and peri-urban, 
but geographically marginalised areas still lag behind and are vulnerable to 
poor infrastructure, environmental instability, and remain unevenly covered 
by social services. It also shows the way that earlier dynamic forms of  civil 
society at community level have become less active, suggesting the need for 
strengthening coalitions between local government and non-state actors to 
reduce ‘elite capture’.
I hope that this restudy of  2017 will become a useful resource in 
Bangladesh and that it will inspire the use of  power analysis in other 
countries. Although the study’s observations and conclusions are the 
authors’ sole responsibility, the study will help Sweden, in cooperation with 
Bangladeshi governmental and non-governmental actors, to better design 
development action that reaches the poorest. I am confident that the study’s 
findings also will be used as a reference for better inclusion of  poor people’s 
perspectives on development, something that is key to the reduction of  
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Foreword by the Ambassador
This restudy of  Understanding the Local Rural Power Structure in Bangladesh was 
commissioned by the Embassy of  Sweden with the purpose to identify, 
analyse and describe formal and informal political, social and economic 
drivers of  change in comparison with the Power Study conducted in 2004. 
The original study stressed the importance of  carrying out analyses 
of  formal and informal political, social and economic power structures 
and power relations as a way of  boosting our understanding of  the 
opportunities and challenges encountered by women and men living 
in poverty as they try to shape and improve their lives. The 2004 study 
also revealed the main barriers and challenges that the poor people face, 
indicated areas in which pro-poor change is taking place at local level, 
and explored the limitations of  these local change processes. 
Over twelve years have passed since the original study was carried 
out, and many things have changed in Bangladesh to the better for people 
living in poverty. The reality of  interlinked formal and informal power 
structures and relations at micro-, meso-, and macro- levels in Bangladesh 
are still identified as one of  the main challenges for well-functioning local 
governance. The restudy of  2017 is relevant as it presents an updated 
analysis on these relations and structures, and how they act as major barriers 
for social change, gender equality and effective poverty alleviation. 
The Embassy of  Sweden is pleased to share the restudy findings which 
will provide well researched but relatively rare comparable insights into 
the political economy of  rural Bangladesh. It is also valuable as a research 
source on comparable anthropological analysis over time of  the local power 
structure in Bangladesh.
I am happy to learn that the new study highlights the significant economic 
progress made by Bangladesh as well the ways economic opportunities have 
been enhanced through government and civil society action for all groups 
since the earlier study. While the new study found that the local power 
structure continues to grow less rigid, women and men continue to face 
significant barriers to empowerment and participation through the reliance 
on informal patronage relations and connections rather than on rights-
based accountabilities. While the study shows the continuing importance 
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Executive Summary
Development policy and practice requires a detailed understanding of  the 
ways that power operates at the local level. Drawing on a literature review 
and new qualitative data, this study takes a bottom-up view of  how ordinary 
people try to deal with the local power structure in their daily lives. Following 
up on an earlier study carried out in 2004 these issues are considered in three 
contrasting areas of  Greater Faridpur District,  plus one new urban study 
site, by analysing the changing formal and informal institutions that govern 
people’s lives. The research addresses two main questions: (i) what does the 
local power structure look like, and (ii) is it changing in ways that enable 
people living in poverty to make stronger claims on rights and entitlements? 
It documents the barriers and challenges that people face, and explores the 
current limits to local change processes. The study aims to complement more 
conventional macro-level analyses of  power undertaken at country level.
Chapter 1 begins by summarising the findings of  the earlier study, and 
then discusses context and the economic and political changes that have 
taken place. It outlines the methodology, which draws on a literature review 
and on a set of  new semi-structured interviews and disaggregated focus 
group discussions. As before the fieldwork was carried out in one peri-urban, 
one well-connected, and one remote village community, plus the urban slum 
study site. Key concepts used in the analysis are then discussed, including 
various ways of  understanding power structures based on concepts of  
governance, informality, empowerment, and patriarchy. The enduring 
role of  patron-client relations as a key element of  the power structure is 
explained, and the benefits and risks for poorer people of  such relationships 
and arrangements are discussed.
Following the structure of  the earlier study, Chapter 2 updates the five 
main sets of  institutions that make up the local power structure. First is 
the three tier administrative system of  local government of  Zila (district), 
Upazila (UPZ, sub-district) and Union. A key change was the 2009 Local 
Government (Union Parishad) Act that created a local Ward ‘sabha’ 
(council) meeting system, introduced a Citizen Charter, and brought 
measures to increase women’s representation. Second we discuss political 
institutions. A weakened political opposition now leaves the ruling Awami 
League (AL) party as the dominant and largely unchallenged political 
actor in a way that is quite different from earlier. Local elections have 
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The well-connected village has also improved its infrastructure and 
its economy. The expansion of  national and international migration 
opportunities, supported by government and NGOs, has had positive effects 
on local livelihoods. However, we found growing politicisation of  local level 
institutions here as well, with the ruling party deploying informal strategies 
to work around the locally elected opposition-affiliated UP Chair. With the 
backing of  the local MP, the UPZ Chair – who was formerly the UP Chair 
when we did our earlier study, and is AL-affiliated - extends party power by 
managing a patronage network in terms of  access to jobs and local positions 
on committees and civil society groups, to some extent side lining the UP. 
He nevertheless retains his solid local reputation for settling disputes fairly, 
with shalish arrangements that are reported as mainly working well. His 
relative is the local UP Chair, which is another factor that helps in managing 
the relationship, suggesting that clan-based politics continues to provide a 
measure of  stability to local institutions, even where there are party political 
differences. In this location formal rights-based civil society action by 
development NGOs has also faded since the earlier research. Forms of  civil 
society loan and small business support have increased and are well liked by 
both poor and non-poor. There are no reports of  people struggling to repay 
their NGO loans as we had come across last time. 
In the remote village, the picture is quite different. Despite its proximity 
to the town, this village remains cut off by a large river. There has 
been little infrastructural development to improve local connectivity or 
enhance access to economic opportunities for this area’s local inhabitants. 
Here, the economic opportunities are far fewer than in the other two 
areas and people’s economic position has become less favourable. Severe 
environmental pressures are also experienced in the form of  large-scale 
river erosion (perhaps exacerbated by climate change) and this has caused 
many households to leave their homestead and farm land and resettle. 
Economic pressure has led to increased out-migration more from a position 
of  weakness here than from one of  relative strength as observed in the other 
two locations. Dhaka’s expanding local informal sector garment industry (as 
opposed to the ready-made garment export sector) has become a growing 
source of  new small-scale economic opportunities for many households in 
this community, though it is not as lucrative as opportunities observed in 
the other two areas, and appears to be dependent on expanding the use 
of  child labour. Once again, we found the relative marginalization of  a 
local opposition UP Chair. The MP has a high level of  control over the 
distribution of  externally provided resources from government, which is 
achieved through the use of  a loyal party ‘informal coordinator’, who is also 
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also become more politicised and a stronger Members of  Parliament 
(MPs) role has emerged in determining how local development activities 
are now carried out. Third, at the level of  formal civil society, we find 
that economic support from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 
our communities has expanded, but the NGO sector itself  is less diverse. 
Rights-based NGO development work with the poorest has largely faded 
away (apart from in the urban study site). There is also more political 
control of  local civil society associations. Fourth, we find that informal 
civil society in Greater Faridpur has continued to decline in its traditional 
forms, such as the local village level institutions. However, we do find 
cases of  local level protest and community level action, sometimes taking 
unruly forms, in both rural and urban areas. Finally, the changes to the 
judiciary are briefly discussed, including the changing role of  the ‘shalish’ 
(traditional dispute settlement meetings) and continuing decline of  the 
formal Village Courts.
Chapter 3 presents the main findings in relation to each of  the four 
study locations. The peri-urban village has experienced sustained economic 
growth that has improved local livelihoods. The area is more urbanised 
and will in 2017 be absorbed into the City Corporation. People report 
that local businesses are doing well, and that economic support from 
NGOs is useful and appreciated. The law and order situation is reported 
to be good, and there is a positive level of  communal harmony between 
different religious and ethnic groups locally. There is community support 
for ongoing efforts to tackle underage marriages by government and 
NGOs. Forms of  ‘traditional’ authority such as the matbars (village elders) 
continue to lose power. Compared with before, the elected Union Parishad 
has become less central to local development processes. With a UP Chair 
who is affiliated to the political opposition, local ruling party activists with 
the support of  the MP have set up informal by-pass arrangements that 
ensure that they maintain as much control as possible over local affairs. The 
party has also increased its influence over local civil society groups such 
as School Committees and Business Associations, contributing to a higher 
level of  local politicisation than we had found before. The types of  win-win 
pro-poor coalitions between local leaders and civil society at UP level that 
we encountered in the earlier study are much rarer today. However, there 
are still cases of  small-scale informal community-level civil society action, 
such as the organisation of  a defence group to challenge the threat of  loss of  
water rights by local interest groups.
and empirical data to reflect on what is happening in these communities 
in relation to the local power structure today, and how this situation has 
changed from the earlier decade. To summarise, we find that market 
connectivity is much higher than before, which means that people have 
improved economic positions, but access to new opportunities for inclusive 
local participation in decision making have not increased to the same 
degree. Poorer people still understand the power structure primarily as 
a highly personalised set of  informal relationships with more powerful 
people, including but not restricted to, elected or administrative officials. 
The main actors in the power structure remain the same as before, but 
the power of  MPs has increased, along with the growth of  politicisation 
within the local power structure. Continuing a trend that was identified 
last time, a more multifocal power structure increasingly governs people’s 
access to political and economic opportunities, as compared to the previous 
unifocal one that had been based on the power of  local landowning elites. 
This means that power structure is becoming more flexible than before, 
and people’s access to connections, information and resources has 
broadened. Despite a high level of  agency, resourcefulness and creativity 
shown by many households, dealing with the power structure requires 
constant effort to build connections and negotiate partisan political 
interests in order to access opportunities, resources and entitlements. 
The diversity of  NGO work has declined, leading to more economic support 
but less rights-based work that could support more inclusivity. 
Women’s relationship to the local power structure continues to 
evolve in ways that bring both positive and less favourable outcomes. Women’s 
presence and visibility in UP, UPZ and other local decision-making forums 
is undoubtedly increasing. We heard for example from women in the peri-
urban area that the newly-introduced UPZ level Women’s Development 
Forum is widely viewed as a positive step for increasing voice, and that the 
Child Marriage Protection Committee is operating reasonably well. We 
saw that female empowerment through women’s increased participation in 
productive economic activities is also challenging aspects of  local power, 
signalled for example by reports of  stronger voice in household decision-
making, and by a reported perception from some women of  an increased 
readiness to initiate divorce when mistreated or abused by their husband. 
We also found that local civil society groups do sometimes take action 
against sexual harassment (such as a case relating to schoolgirl stalking in the 
peri-urban study area) though such action may as much be about defending 
‘honour’ as much as about women’s rights. 
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a UP member. This made it possible for party activists to bypass the UP level 
distribution system for local entitlements such as Test Relief  and Food for 
Work (FFW) thereby consolidating a set of  politicised patronage networks. 
Last time we had found one or two relief-oriented NGOs operating here 
that were providing basic welfare goods and services. Today there are more 
NGOs in the area, and these are now providing business training and small-
scale loans designed to improve economic opportunities. The area is less 
socially progressive, with for example more persistence of  child marriage, 
which some claimed was linked with increased mobile phone and social 
media use. This was seen as intensifying concerns about family honour and 
reputation, particularly among the poorest households. 
The slum study site provides some continuities and differences with the 
three other locations. The main similarity was people’s relative economic 
prosperity levels (with a thriving small scale local business sector, and factory 
employment available in the ready-made export garment industry). We 
also found the use of  informal administrative arrangements to extend the 
ruling party’s influence in the local community. Since this is an informal 
settlement, there is no corresponding local government institution which 
residents can hold directly accountable. The City Corporation has created 
an unofficial Unit Office (UO) located in the centre of  the slum, staffed by 
party activists who levy informal taxes and provide some community services 
to residents. There are two classes of  residents in the slum: the original 
squatters who are de facto landlords and who rent out accommodation to 
those who have arrived more recently, who are effectively second class 
citizens. Both are at high risk of  eviction. NGOs here provide a range of  
useful services, but the community-based organisations that they form 
tend to be dominated by the former group. This is because control of  
these CBOs enables these households to add value to their properties 
through improving sanitation and water supply. Nevertheless, the groups 
have also served as useful vehicles for people to mobilise against regular 
threats of  eviction. Law and order is said to have improved and this 
arrangement is generally preferred to the previous informal arrangements 
in which insecurity gangs and police harassment were more common. 
The UO has formed good relationships with the NGOs working in the slum, 
but this relationship also implies a level of  political control. Here too we find 
that patronage relationships have endured as key components of  the local 
power structure, along with community-based solidarities. 
Chapter 4 discusses the main findings of  the study in the light of  the 
terms of  reference. It draws on both the background literature review 
small-scale collective action to address local problems, such as land rights, 
often assisted by more powerful supportive patrons (such as journalists or 
lawyers). But aside from these messy spaces of  ‘political society’ in which 
people with relatively little power attempt to contest and negotiate, we did 
not find evidence of  the kind of  progressive social movements that some 
observers have hoped might emerge in support of  social and political rights 
more widely. More positively, we found less presence of  local mastan criminal 
gang brokers or intermediaries than studies from other parts of  Bangladesh 
might lead us to expect.
The extension of  the ruling party’s power means that local power 
relations in each of  our locations have been further incorporated into the 
wider ‘political game’. The use of  informal strategies is becoming a key 
tool for this incorporation. If  there is an elected official in place who is 
inconveniently from the opposition party, they are simply worked around by 
creating informal coordinator and intermediation roles, using patron-client 
relationships. In the same way, key local civil society organizations such as 
business associations are increasingly co-opted by placing politically affiliated 
individuals in charge. One overall result is that local political competition 
has been reduced since the earlier study. This is a cause for concern because 
it leaves people with fewer opportunities to represent their interests, and 
because of  fears that the opposition vacuum could become filled in the future 
by political or religious extremists. It also makes less likely the possibility that 
future new independent political leaders might emerge from local civil society. 
Competition is instead expressed through increased local factionalism within 
ruling party, evident from the tensions between MP and UPZ/UP levels 
in the peri-urban site, or the recent attack on the Unit Office in the slum. 
This might be taken as hinting at future instability. However, we did not find 
evidence of  extremist political activity in our study areas.
Locally distributed resources are therefore still being mobilised in 
ways that give ordinary people little influence or control over decisions. 
Furthermore, such resources are being drawn from the centre, rather than 
being raised locally through taxes (even though a strong economy means 
there is increasing potential for doing this). Only in the slum area did we 
see effective efforts made to raise new local taxes - albeit informally - in 
an attempt to improve local services, and we found this to be generally 
received quite positively. The political interests are directly served by the 
allocation of  resources at local level. Recently changed rules that now 
allow for the formation of  Project Implementation Committees without 
needing a UP member as Chair contribute further to this. Nevertheless, 
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In many small ways patriarchal norms are constantly being resisted and 
renegotiated, but women continue to face many challenges. For example, we 
found that women committee members often feel marginalised, are rarely 
given Project Implementation Committees to chair, that decisions are still 
made mainly by the MP or by male UP/UPZ staff, and that if  women 
are too talkative in the meetings they are marginalised further. There 
was no perception that women’s presence made the distribution of  safety 
net entitlements any more gender equitable in the communities that we 
studied. Wages received by women remain lower than men’s and in some 
cases almost half  (in the remote village), and women’s inheritance rights 
are in practice still weak. We found many cases where shalish rulings were 
made in favour of  male defendants in gender-related disputes such as land 
inheritance or violence against women. The view of  one female focus group 
member that the power structure is associated primarily with men continues 
to be a problem. But overall, there does seem to be more women present in 
local formal decision-making meetings, which is good news.
Moving to the changing role of  local formal institutions such as 
the Unions, while these are working quite well, a concerning finding 
is the increasing marginalisation of  this key tier of  decentralised local 
government. This has in part been driven by the increasing dominance 
of  the power of  MPs who seek to build political support directly in 
local communities and manage vote banks. The result is that the UP is 
increasingly being bypassed as a potentially inclusive and accountable 
centre of  local decision-making and resource distribution, as MPs play 
more direct roles in local affairs. This is particularly the case where local 
Chairs are from opposition groups. This has negative implications for 
local government capacity building efforts aimed at strengthening 
participation and civic engagement. In contrast to our 2004 findings 
that the UP role was increasing in significance, this time we were told: 
‘The UP’s glory is now in the past’. 
Nor has the closer collaboration between UPs and NGOs in local 
development work that was embedded in the aims of  the 2009 UP Act 
materialised to any significant degree. However, the modest gains towards 
increased women’s representation are a step forward, even if  many 
informants continue to report the marginalization of  women within 
decision-making processes at UPZ, UP and Ward levels. When it comes 
to informal civil society institutions, we found that a resilient (though 
shifting) set of  patronage relations remains at the heart of  UP and Ward 
level meetings and activities. We did find some cases of  poor people taking 
coalition building that produced ‘win-win’ outcomes for both poor and non-
poor people. Today, while we note that there has been positive economic 
change experienced by most people in the communities we visited (although 
the remote village continues to be marginalised), we are less optimistic about 
the recent ways in which the power structure has been changing. 
Economic dynamism has intensified, resulting in improved livelihoods 
for many people. Women’s market participation has increased as many 
continue to access new economic opportunities (often with the support of  
NGOs). Communities are now more geographically and socially connected 
than before, and households have greater choice in the range and type of  
connections they seek to form. Migration opportunities have increased. 
Progress with achieving women’s political inclusion into local institutions 
is occurring, albeit at a slow rate. Elements of  an older power structure 
remain, with the persistence of  patron-client relations, elite clan politics 
and patriarchal norms, but these are slowly changing. The range of  patrons 
people can access has continued to widen, increasing opportunities for those 
with less power to pursue more favourable forms of  connection. Within the 
power structure, the blurring of  formal and informal roles and relationships 
has also continued, creating a complex ‘web’ of  relationships that limits civic 
engagement but nevertheless offers up some opportunities for incremental 
inclusive change.
What is different today? Local government institutions have the potential 
to continue to play enhanced roles based on recent and continuing capacity 
building efforts, but under current political conditions they risk becoming 
marginalised. Civil society space has become reduced, particularly that 
formerly occupied by radical NGOs and civil society groups addressing local 
rights-based development in relation to land, local political participation 
and civic engagement. As a result, there are fewer opportunities for the 
types of  win-win coalitions we had identified and predicted would become 
more frequent in the earlier study. Associations and other local civil society 
groupings are increasingly being captured by political interests. This 
means that while there is a wider range of  patrons available (for example 
local media supported activism), opportunities for poorer people to build 
horizontal forms of  solidarity remain limited. Connected to this trend, local 
level political competition has also diminished as the ruling political party 
has consolidated control of  local power structure and weakened any formal 
political opposition. The forms of  political competition that do take place 
are now primarily expressed through increasing factionalism at local level 
within the ruling party. 
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the increased range of  social safety net services, including new forms of  
support for disabled people, are proving relatively effective measures to 
reduce exclusion even with their politicised distribution. 
While people are better off economically, the opportunities for people 
to access improved participation in local decision-making and shape service 
provision that we hoped for after the earlier study have not kept pace. 
One exception is the example of  community-based organizations in the 
slum, which have succeeded in driving some modest improvements to 
services. But these gains are also compromised by disproportionately 
reflecting the interests of  better-off slum dwellers. We also found a higher 
profile than last time in our study sites for the rights of  disabled people, 
though this was mainly expressed through claims on welfare benefits 
rather than that of  broader social change. 
Civil society space, as we have seen, has been shrinking both in the 
sense that it has become dominated by market approaches to development 
(loans, business support) and because fewer rights-based or radical 
organizations are in evidence. The decline of  rights-based development 
NGOs is a result of  many complex factors, including tensions with 
government, internal organizational problems, practical difficulties with 
local mobilization approaches, and changing donor support trends. 
Their relative absence – at least in the Greater Faridpur sites – raises 
short-term problems for poor people seeking to advance their rights, and 
longer-term problems for ongoing progress with decentralization and 
local accountability. In the earlier study we found that when NGOs and 
local authorities worked together through building productive coalitions 
or forming appropriate partnership arrangements there were sometimes 
positive outcomes for poorer people. Today there is less countervailing 
pressure from civil society visible on issues such as land rights or extra-
judicial killings, because to do so would risk problems from local AL 
leaders. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that the government strategy 
of  building a co-opted civil society into a unified national development 
approach is one that may yet bring stable and inclusive economic growth, 
even if  this is at a political cost. 
Chapter 5 provides a conclusion. Our earlier study had reported a 
cautiously optimistic picture. We identified small but potentially significant 
ways that new institutional spaces were opening up that were making it possible 
for some poor women and men to improve their situations. This centred on 
improvements to the functioning of  local government structures, the evolving 
inclusivity of  some local institutions, and forms of  civil society action and 
senses: (i) currently relatively inclusive, the system could fracture if  there 
is sudden political change and disruption in the future; and (ii) for poorer 
households, falling foul of  the ruling party’s patronage will have serious 
consequences, with fewer alternative non-affiliated patrons to whom to 
go. The social protection system is particularly vulnerable to political 
capture at the local level. There is a need to protect those people who are 
left behind within the overall picture of  positive growth, such as those in 
marginal locations and those with marginal identities, and women who face 
continuing marginalization within formal governance structures.
The earlier study concluded with four practical insights for governmental 
and non-governmental agencies seeking to support pro-poor change 
in Bangladesh: the need to (i) recognise the importance of  economic 
development as a solid foundation for progressive change; (ii) find ways of  
supporting local government and civil society jointly; (iii) understand and 
build upon local difference to avoid ‘one size fits all’ support strategies; and 
(iv) continue to identify new opportunities to support pro-poor coalitions 
involving local elites. 
In the case of  (i), economic growth is now front and centre in mainstream 
development policy, but we cannot afford for this to be at the expense 
of  diversity, inclusion, and civil society action. The continuing value of  
economic growth to improving livelihoods is clear, but ‘inclusive growth’ 
remains a challenging goal. Our analysis highlights the risk that economic 
gain displaces issues of  inclusivity, participation and rights (political pain). 
With (ii), to support to local government and civil society in mutually 
reinforcing ways remains key to securing growth within inclusion. But it has 
become more difficult today, given the decline of  rights-based civil society 
actors such as NGOs. The presence of  types of  informal civil society and 
the persistence of  forms of  ‘rude accountability’ nevertheless provide some 
cause for optimism in this regard. With (iii), we still argue there is a need to 
avoid ‘one size fits all’ approaches and that it is vital to pay close attention 
to difference. People in the remote location are made more vulnerable by 
environmental vulnerability and poor infrastructure. Our data also suggests 
the need to continue to treat with caution generalizations about what is 
happening in Bangladesh, such as those commonly made in relation to 
extremism, intolerance and religious tensions. Finally, (iv), the need to find 
ways to support pro-poor coalitions involving local elites remains, even 
though we found fewer cases of  NGOs working constructively with local 
officials and informal power holders to address local problems.
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The combination of  stronger local livelihoods and reduced democratic 
space is producing mixed outcomes for poor men and women. Undoubtedly, 
the ruling party is delivering increased prosperity and a degree of  stability. 
Economic growth makes people more optimistic about the future, 
particularly younger people. There are small gains specifically for women in 
both the economic and the local government decision-making spheres, even 
though many constraints remain. There are encouraging signs that informal 
civil society action remains vigorous, along with other forms of  ‘rude 
accountability’ in which people confront abuses by those with more power. 
But the overall picture of  economic gain has not come without cost – in the 
form of  ‘political pain’. The formal power structure may be becoming more 
fragile, brittle and less resilient than before. The ruling party’s increasing 
dominance within the networks that connect people with less power to those 
with more comes at a cost.
As World Development Report (WDR) 2017 reminds us, understanding 
how the local power structure works, and how it is perceived, continues 
to be important themes for mainstream development policy and practice. 
Power asymmetries contribute to exclusion, inequality and restrict 
equitable growth. As a result, there is a continuing need for policy makers 
and development agencies to prioritise civic engagement, coalition-
building and forms of  bargaining that can take better account of  the 
needs of  those people excluded from growth, and whose interests are 
captured by those seeking to maintain the status quo. 
Our re-study found levels of  coalition building between local government 
leaders and civil society groups to be lower than those we encountered in 
2004. Although there are some reforms in place that have been designed to 
increase levels of  civic engagement it is not easy to find evidence that these 
are working. The decline of  the UP’s role and position as the crucial lowest 
institution of  local government, a change that brings negative implications 
for poor people’s participation in decision making, joint government and 
civil society pro-poor coalition building, and increased local resource 
mobilisation. The implications of  these should not be seen as a purely 
technical problem, and supports WDR 2017’s argument that we need to 
think beyond technical ‘capacity building’ of  local institutions to engage 
more fully with power issues in supporting more inclusive growth.
Ordinary people are seeking to advance their interests within a wider 
framework of  political and social institutions that may be becoming less 








This study is concerned with understanding local change processes and 
people’s efforts to deal with power as they go about their lives. It updates 
original research that was undertaken by the authors more than a decade 
ago in late 2004 in the Greater Faridpur area of  central Bangladesh. 
This was published as Understanding the Local Rural Power Structure in Bangladesh 
by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Lewis and 
Hossain, 2008). The report aimed to better understand how the institutions, 
relationships and process that made up the local power structure both 
facilitated and constrained poor people’s efforts to improve their livelihoods, 
and the ways that the poorest people went about trying to manage 
relationships with more powerful people in their local communities.
The earlier study helped to inform the Embassy’s policy dialogue in 
Bangladesh, contributed to methodological development of  power analysis 
at Sida headquarters, and was used in the preparation of  Sweden’s 2008-12 
Country Cooperation Strategy. Other major donors in Bangladesh such as 
the World Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) also 
drew upon the study when developing their local governance programmes.1 
1  In the Foreword to the original study Jan Bjerninger and Olof  Sandkull from Sida 
Stockholm wrote: ‘Over the years, it has strengthened the Embassy’s policy dialogue 
in Bangladesh and, as the first analysis focusing on the local level, it has contributed to 
methodological development of  power analysis at Sida HQ. Finally, it provided valuable 
input with regards to shaping the direction of  the new Swedish Country Cooperation 
Strategy with Bangladesh 2008–2012. Other major donors such as the World Bank and 
UNDP have also benefited greatly from the study while developing their major local 
governance programme in Bangladesh’. 
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same approach and data collection methods.3 Where possible, we tried to 
reconnect with people we had known during the earlier study. At the request 
of  the Embassy, an additional fourth study site was added in the form of  an 
urban slum community in Dhaka.
1.2 Background: the wider context
Political changes during the past decade mean that the country’s 
longstanding ‘illiberal democracy’ has begun moving in a new direction. 
The old bipartisan political system in which two competing political blocs, 
the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), had 
mostly alternated in power following regular elections since 1991 seems 
to have ended. Following the 18-month long Military-backed Caretaker 
Government that took power in 2007, an AL-led alliance won a majority 
at the 29 December 2008 general election. After disagreement around the 
reform of  the arrangements for the January 2014 elections, the BNP refused 
to take part and the AL was re-elected unopposed for an unprecedented 
second term in government. The AL is now dominant and the political 
opposition is in disarray, and the nature of  Bangladesh’s ‘partyarchy’ (Hassan 
2013) has changed. There are concerns voiced that the restrictions on the 
activities of  mainstream parties will create a vacuum in which new political 
formations that favour extremism could create a threat to the stability of  the 
current political institutions and to country’s record of  relatively inclusive 
growth (for example, Khan 2017).
The AL government has moved to consolidate its power. It has enhanced 
the authority of  Members of  Parliament (MPs) by giving them an advisory 
role to the local UPZ sub-district authorities. According to Siddiqui and 
Ahmed (2016, p.574) this has made worse a situation in which ‘MPs dictate 
instead of  advising the affairs of  local government’. It has also further 
3  The fieldwork was carried out with the invaluable assistance of  an outstanding field 
team: Mr Abdur Rahman Liton, Mr Shakhawat Hossain Taslim, Ms Irfath Ara Iva, Ms 
Shamsun Naher, Mr Md. Belal Hossain, and Mr Md. Abu Alam. Liton, Taslim and Belal 
were also part of  the original study in 2004, which added useful continuity. The main 
portion of  the Greater Faridpur fieldwork (focus groups and semi-structured interviews) 
was undertaken in December 2015-January 2016, and most of  the urban study was 
carried out during May-June 2016. The rural study preceded the series of  UP elections 
that were held in six phases between January and June 2016. Some of  the data has been 
updated to reflect changes following the elections, but the picture presented in the report 
mainly reflects the period just before elections took place. Brief  follow up visits were also 
made to clarify some questions, and the provisional findings were presented to informants 
in May 2017 at a dissemination workshop in Greater Faridpur.
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This new study was also commissioned by the Embassy of  Sweden, 
and like the earlier one has combined a desk study that synthesised recent 
academic and policy literature with the collection of  a set of  new empirical 
data drawing on community-level interviews and focus group discussions. 
The field research was conducted in Rajbari and Faridpur districts, an area 
where there had been a long history of  Swedish support to government 
agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).2 
The original study was based on data collected from three contrasting 
fieldwork locations. Each one had been chosen to reflect a different level of  
infrastructure and spatial connectivity: (i) a ‘remote’ village where villagers 
were relatively isolated and where we expected to find the traditional 
rural power structure largely in place, (ii) a ‘well-connected’ village with 
better access to markets and good transport infrastructure, and (iii) a ‘peri-
urban’ village that was located close to the main district town. We were 
particularly interested in how people’s relationships with the power structure 
varied across settings, as well as in important cross-cutting dimensions such 
gender and power, the role of  civil society, and the relationship between 
formal and informal structures, that we know would be common to each 
site. We first carried out semi-structured interviews with key informants in 
each community, and with power holders from government, civil society 
and ‘traditional’ institutions. We then heard from local community 
members in each of  the study areas through convening a series of  focus 
group discussions. These enabled us to gain insights into peoples’ different 
experiences, perspectives and perspectives on the power structure from the 
‘bottom up’. In each location, the groups were disaggregated by poor and 
non-poor villagers, and again by gender. Four focus groups were therefore 
held in each of  the study locations: female poor, male poor, female non-poor 
and male non-poor.
For the follow up study we returned to the same three locations in order 
to learn what changes had taken place during the ensuing decade, using the 
2  Faridpur and Rajbari are districts in central Bangladesh forming part of  Dhaka 
Division, situated on the banks of  the river Padma (Lower Ganges). The Greater 
Faridpur region includes the districts of  Rajbari, Gopalgonj, Madaripur, Shariatpur 
and Faridpur. Faridpur District has a population of  over 1.7 million people and Rajbari 
just over one million.
age.5 The informal sector remains the main source of  urban employment. 
Democracy and governance are still deeply problematic, with low levels of  
civic participation, high levels of  corruption (147th out of  167 according 
to Transparency International), and relatively little progress being made 
with civil service reform and building more transparent institutions. 
Tax revenue collection is below 10% of  gross domestic product (GDP) 
making the level, quality and sustainability of  public services generally low. 
1.3 Greater Faridpur
No single district or region in a country as diverse as Bangladesh can be 
truly representative. Greater Faridpur has no specific characteristics that 
would disqualify it in this regard, or render it atypical of  the country as a 
whole. The majority of  the people in this area still undertake agriculture-
related work, but do so within a local economy that is rapidly diversifying. 
Most households (almost 60%) continue to rely primarily on agricultural 
income, with non-agricultural labour, services, transport, construction and 
remittances making up the remainder. 
Situated on the banks of  the river Padma, many local communities also 
face growing environmental pressures such as soil quality depletion and 
riverbank erosion. There has been longstanding migration from the area: 
to Dhaka, and to Asia and the Middle East. There is a substantial Hindu 
minority in the area (just under 10% of  the population), along with smaller 
numbers of  Buddhist and Christian minority groups. We also encountered 
settled communities of  formerly itinerant bedia or ‘river gypsy’ people.
Greater Faridpur is a relatively peaceful and politically stable area, but 
it is not immune from the wider concerns around political violence and 
terrorism that continue to affect many areas of  Bangladesh. For example, 
the police recently arrested four suspected leaders of  the banned militant 
group Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) (Daily Star, August 28, 2016).
1.4 The urban research site
At Sida’s request, for the follow up research project we added a new urban 
slum study site to the existing three locations in Greater Faridpur. We 
selected a slum community in the Mohakali area of  Dhaka, drawing on 
5  Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/09/bangladesh-girls-
damaged-child-marriage, accessed November 18, 2016.
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politicised the local administrative system by allowing party affiliation to 
play a greater role in local Union Parishad (UP) activities. In 2016, elections 
were held with political party affiliations on the ballot paper for the first time 
(instead of  just a candidate’s name as before). This may also have been a 
factor that contributed to increased election violence during these elections 
(Siddiqui and Ahmed 2016). 
The economy has performed well since the earlier study. According to 
UNDP (2016), Bangladesh has seen a ‘major economic transformation’ in 
recent years. The economy has grown (average 6.3% between 2011-15, 
and 7.1% in the 2016 financial year), poverty has declined (from 31.5% of  
the population in 2011 to 24.7% in 2015 below the national poverty line), 
and there have been impressive gains in productivity and infrastructure 
improvement. Bangladesh’s social development indicators improved as 
measured against the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). A new 
National Social Security Strategy (NSSS) has been put in place with the 
potential to better address social protection in terms of  multiple dimensional 
needs and risks.4 The government’s Seventh Five Year Plan (2016-20) aims 
to further increase growth, build more citizen inclusion, and strengthen 
resilience.
However, major challenges remain. There are still high levels of  
extreme poverty (12.9% of  the total population in 2015-16), along with 
growing inequality and increasing vulnerability. Growth has also been 
achieved at the expense of  high levels of  environmental damage. Women 
remain disadvantaged in terms of  earnings (52% lower than men’s) and 
labour market participation (34% as opposed to 82% for men). Women’s 
low economic status is reflected in high levels of  gender-based violence 
(experienced by 65% of  women in the last 12 months according to a 
recent government study). The country also has the fourth highest rate of  
child marriage in the world, a statistic that the government attempted to 
bring down by reducing the legal age of  marriage from 18 to 16 years of  
4  There has been an expansion of  social protection measures since the earlier study. There 
are now a total of  145 ‘social safety net’ schemes that are now being provided through a 
total of  23 different government ministries. Around 25-50% is estimated not to reach the 
intended recipients due to poor targeting and corruption. However, only 2.2% of  GDP 
is currently allocated to social safety net expenditure, compared with 6-8% for other 
middle-income countries (‘Allocate more for social safety nets’, Star Business Report, 
Daily Star, 11 April, 2016).
in local infrastructure and this was slowly improving connectivity and 
market access. A range of  NGOs were delivering services and working 
on rights-based approaches to development (such as improving land 
rights for the poor) in attempts to foster more inclusive development at 
the local level. We found that the UP was at the centre of  on-going local 
decentralization efforts, and this was to some extent reshaping the local 
power structure. Both the UP and the local shalish were receiving support 
from government and international agencies that aimed to strengthen 
their capacity to be more democratic and participatory, and to improve their 
gender inclusivity. At the same time, there was also political polarization 
between supporters of  government and opposition parties, played out 
within increasing factionalism and the increasing politicization of  local level 
decision-making and resource allocation, sometimes leading to conflict.
 Summing up the findings and recommendation from the study we 
commented:
Many people who live in poverty in rural Bangladesh still have little 
faith that local institutions will provide the means to secure rights 
or justice, but our study found some evidence that those with power 
can sometimes respond positively to negotiation and pressure from 
civil society around creating potential win-win outcomes which 
can benefit both poor and non-poor people. For example, we 
found that a union chairman may cooperate with an NGO that is 
seeking to strengthen land rights for the poor if  it helps to build a 
stronger political support base for him. Similarly, when previously 
excluded people, such as landless women, campaign to take up 
positions within governance institutions such as the union or the 
shalish, either on the basis of  bottom-up or top-down pressures, 
small areas of  opportunity and policy ‘space’ are sometimes opened 
up. The challenge for the future is to combine understanding of  
this complex ‘micropolitics’ of  local change with support for the 
strengthening of  broader economic and political pro-poor change 
at the district and national levels. 
Four main insights for practice emerged from the study: (i) designing and 
implementing interventions that recognise and build upon local institutional 
difference and diversity; (ii) finding opportunities for the identification of  
win-win coalitions with elites to help secure sustainable pro-poor change; 
(iii) supporting NGOs and civil society alongside broader institutional 
support to local and central government; and (iv) recognising more fully 
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Abul Hossain’s local knowledge from earlier work on slum rehabilitation. 
We also consulted Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK), a prominent urban 
water, sanitation and health NGO. We followed a similar approach to 
data collection to the one we used in the other three locations.6
As part of  this new component we had originally hoped to identify some 
migrants originating from Greater Faridpur, in order to make a connection 
with the earlier work, but there were very few to be found. Residents were 
from diverse rural locations and mostly originated from areas such as 
Noakhali, Mymensingh and Barisal. We did speak with one woman who 
was originally from rural Faridpur who had migrated as a small child with 
her widowed mother when their home was destroyed in the 1991 floods.
1.5 The first power structure study
The aim of  the earlier study was to understand key issues of  power and 
governance ‘from the ground up’. It focused on both the ‘traditional’ 
village power structure (its system of  elders, structure of  landholding, and 
its mechanisms for resolving disputes) as well as on villagers’ links with the 
UP as the lowest main tier of  local government, and with non-state actors 
such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local associations. It 
noted that the power structure was far from static, and that even its so-called 
‘traditional’ aspects were evolving and changing. 
These institutions of  the power structure are set out in Table 1 
(below, in updated form). Here we find the administrative tiers of  local 
government leading down to Union/Ward level, the political structure 
from Parliament down to local level village politics, the judiciary from High 
Court to Village Court, and two different but inter-related arenas of  civil 
society organisations and activities characterised as formal and informal. 
We use formal civil society to encapsulate the NGOs and other established 
associational forms, and informal civil society to include ad hoc collective 
action groups such as those formed locally and temporarily to protect rights, 
as well as traditional social structures such as samaj and shalish. 
The mid-2000s was a period during which different kinds of  change 
processes were occurring at the local level. There was growing investment 
6  The precise locations of  the study locations, and the identities of  people we spoke to 
during the research, have been anonymised in order to protect all those people who 
kindly participated in the research.
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two confrontational political party blocs. For example, civil society 
organisations could sometimes work with an elected UP leader to help 
strengthen local land rights for people if  this increased his popularity. 
Traditional village elites might accept a more gender-inclusive shalish 
arrangements if  this increased their reputation and prestige, and brought 
in more outside resources. The main source of  power locally was no 
longer solely the ownership of  land, but also increasingly important 
were the connections people were able to make to resources outside the 
village which they could then distribute: such as development resources, 
political linkages, and employment and migration opportunities. 
Finally, the study found that these issues were playing out very differently 
across the three village settings studied, leading to the finding that context 
and locality – such as the state of  the economy, types of  civil society 
that were active, and the individual strategies of  local political leaders - 
mattered considerably.
The issues raised in the study continue to be important for current 
development policy and practice. For example, the World Bank’s World 
Development Report 2017 (WDR) main message is that improved governance 
can only be achieved by taking power asymmetries more fully into account 
(World Bank 2017). The report argues for the need to move beyond technical 
and managerialist ‘capacity building’ and ‘best practice’ approaches in 
order to engage more fully with more inclusive forms of  decision making, 
including contestation, coordination, participation, and coalition building 
(World Bank 2017). An engagement with power issues also lies at the heart of  
UNRISD’s Policy Innovations for Transformative Change report on implementing 
the 2013 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UNRISD 2016). 
1.6 Key concepts
A number of  concepts are deployed in the study. First, in order to make 
sense of  the local power structure, it is necessary to briefly contextualize it 
within the broader national level situation. 
Bangladesh’s political settlement (the balance of  power between social 
classes) has enabled a high level of  economic growth and positive change 
around key social indicators, but it has not produced the conditions for a 
stable or inclusive democracy. For what political scientist Douglas North 
(2009) terms an ‘open access’ society, formal property rights, enforceable 
contracts, and an efficient and impersonal bureaucracy are each prerequisites 
that are not sufficiently present in Bangladesh. The result is that organized 
the importance of  economic development as a foundation for sustainable 
governance reform and community level empowerment.
These findings indicated growing synergies between local government 
and civil society actors. In some cases these were leading to strengthening of  
the rights of  the poor and improving participation in local decision-making. 
The study also provided insights into the ways that the central institution 
of  patronage (the unequal relationship between rich powerful landowner 
patrons and poor tenants/clients that has long dominated rural communities) 
was slowly changing. We contrasted our findings with an influential study 
that had taken place in 1979-80 and published as The Net: Power Structure 
in Ten Villages (BRAC, 1982). This earlier study had emphasised the rigid 
nature of  the traditional village level power structure and the propensity of  
village elites to capture any resources provided by government to support 
the local poor and limit the latter’s attempts to organise in pursuit of  their 
interests.7 
There were more patrons for poorer people to choose from including 
local elected officials, party politicians, NGOs and local business leaders 
and their intermediaries. This, we argued, was contributing to a local 
power structure that was becoming less rigid and unitary. Instead it was 
what Mannan (2015) has termed a ‘multifocal power structure’ that 
allowed a little more economic, political and social ‘room for manoeuvre’ 
for disadvantaged groups in their negotiations with local elites. A gradual 
shift was also taking place from ‘net’ to ‘web’, in the sense that while the 
net metaphor had referred to relationships that mainly constrained and 
trapped people, the web implied a set of  relationships connecting people 
in potentially more productive ways. People could still get caught in the 
web, but they could also move across its many strands and form useful 
new connections.
We also found evidence for forms of  positive, negotiated change 
taking place locally that we thought might be sustained, in spite of  the 
overall context of  a turbulent and unstable national and local political 
system that had become highly adversarial and polarised between 
7  It also showed how ‘vertical’ patron-client relations between rich and poor (such as 
landlord/tenant, landowner/sharecropper, moneylender/loanee) were central to social 
structures, making the formation of  such grassroots groups based on ‘horizontal’ links or 
‘social capital’ difficult. Following findings from studies such as The Net, government and 
NGOs began searching for ways to bypass village elites and work directly with the poor 
through forming grassroots groups and better ‘targeting’. 
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Moving to the local level of  the power structure, the concepts of  
governance, empowerment and informality are used to analyse local level 
processes. Governance is understood as the process in which individuals and 
institutions - both public and private, formal and informal - try to manage 
resources, accommodate conflicting and diverse interests, and organise 
forms of  cooperative action. Empowerment is a term that refers to the efforts 
to bring about changes in the distribution or nature of  power within a given 
context, and the outcomes of  such changes. This may be understood at both 
the level of  individuals and/or groups, and individual forms of  resistance as 
well as forms of  group-based political mobilization. 
Informality refers to relationships and networks around power and 
governance that are not formally codified or enforced, such as the forms of  
social and political patronage highlighted above. For example, from the point 
of  view of  a local citizen living in poverty, he or she is confronted with the 
need to deal with unofficial intermediaries (such as an informal charge made 
to access a supposedly free public service) as a form of  unsanctioned rent-
seeking that takes place beyond the realm of  rules-based formal governance. 
Informality operates within (and not just outside) formal institutions. This 
means that in practice both formal and informal relationships help structure 
and mediate the relationship between state and society and are not easily 
disentangled. Focusing on the extent and type of  informality offers insights 
into how power is being exercised in a society, by whom, and for whose 
benefit. We suggest that studying informality is important because provides 
deeper insights into workings of  the power structure that go beyond the 
surface level. The informal dimensions of  public authority/formal state 
processes are central to the workings of  the local power structure. There 
are formal rules associated with governance, but part of  peoples’ daily 
experience is to deal not just with these rules but also with the various 
informal arrangements and obstacles that they face. 
Informality is also important in relation to civil society (see below). 
For example, Partha Chatterjee (2004, p.4) has suggested that civil society 
is merely a ‘closed association of  elite groups’ set aside from the wider 
population of  poor people forced to negotiate and contest their claims in 
relation to government within the wider space of  ‘political society’ where 
there are fewer formal rules and norms.
Finally, patriarchy is central to the power structure in the form of  ‘structures 
of  constraint’ that are associated with kinship and family systems and the 
ideological constructions of  gender identity and selfhood in Bangladesh 
political action (and economic activity too) will normally require the purchase 
of  support on a personalised basis so that the dominant form of  political 
organization becomes one of  ‘competitive clientelism’ (Khan 2013). Without 
a state that can enforce the rule of  law, ‘rent-seeking’8 is commonplace, 
meaning that Bangladesh is more accurately characterized in North’s terms as 
a ‘limited access order’ that does not meet the key conditions for a functioning 
democracy. 
Bangladeshi society is strongly hierarchical, and patronage is a key 
component of  social relationships. Breman (1974) defines patronage as 
‘a pattern of  relationships in which members of  hierarchically arranged 
groups possess mutually recognized, not explicitly stipulated rights and 
obligations involving mutual aid and preferential treatment’ (p.18). 
Patron-client relationships are therefore central to understanding the 
local power structure. Jahangir (1982) emphasises that it is a personal 
transaction between two individuals rather than one that addresses the 
collective good.9 Vertical social arrangements of  mutual obligation 
and loyalty exist between unequal individuals through which people 
negotiate access to resources, protection, social mobility and political 
support. This makes it more difficult for poorer people to build ‘horizontal’ 
relationships of  solidarity among equals, such as through cooperatives or 
the grassroots community groups that some NGOs seek to form. 
From the point of  view of  the poor, such vertical relationships are not 
only asymmetrical but also uncertain, since they tend to be discretionary 
rather than rights-based. The dominance of  patron-client relations is widely 
seen as something that ‘constrains universalism, devitalizes civil society 
and prevents the popular sector from mounting sustained pressure on the 
state’ with mainly negative implications for political participation (Gay, 
1998, p.11). But patron-client relations are not straightforward - they are 
complex, multi-stranded and always evolving as we showed in the earlier 
study. They can also be viewed more positively as the means through 
which those who are poor or excluded undertake their civic engagement, 
seek to improve their security and practice politics.10 
8  This refers to the extraction of  value without making a contribution to productivity.
9  He also makes a distinction between patronage as primarily economic relationship 
and clientelism as the building of  political support - though in practice these may be 
interlinked.
10  Patronage should not only be seen in functional in functional economic or political 
terms: it is also a ‘living moral idiom’ that helps to structure peoples’ political aspirations, 
engagements, practices and relationships (Piliavksy (2014, p.4). 
foundation of  the local power structure were changing, becoming weaker 
as poorer people were growing less dependent on the local landed classes 
for their livelihoods, but they found that no obvious new forms of  social or 
political organisation were taking their place. Finally, Eirik Jansen returned 
a number of  times to an area of  Manikganj district where he had first 
undertaken fieldwork in the 1980s. He found dramatic improvements in 
local infrastructure, increased use of  modern agricultural technologies, the 
rise of  non-agricultural employment and a new and growing centrality 
of  migration based livelihoods in determining household social mobility 
(Jansen and Rahman 2011). There may be value in commissioning more 
such ‘follow up’ studies in the future in order to better capture medium 
change processes in Bangladesh and elsewhere.
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(Kabeer 2011). Patriarchy is not confined to kinship relations within or 
between households, but also informs the way institutional power is exercised 
in the context of  wider interactions the state, markets and civil society. At the 
same time, there is fluidity to this aspect of  the power structure too. Gender 
relations are constantly shifting, and can sometimes be reshaped, through 
market opportunities, government policies and by participation within new 
forms of  association within civil society:
If  it is through the ‘given’ relationships of  family and kinship, the 
‘communities of  birth’, that women gain their sense of  identity and 
personhood, then it is through participation in alternative forms 
of  associational life that they can acquire a reflexive vantage point 
from which to evaluate these relationships (Kabeer 2011, p.503) 
However, in Bangladesh, as in many other countries, progress in 
relation to women’s empowerment and inclusion continues to be slow, with 
‘competing interests remain clustered around power and resources at the 
local government level in ways that exclude women’ (Beall, 2005, p.253). 
1.7 ‘Follow up’ studies
Despite their potential value for understanding change, follow up research 
studies are less common than they should be. There are a few examples 
of  social science researchers working on themes related to this study 
who have returned to the field sites of  their earlier work to explore and 
analyse the changes that have taken place. These provide useful reference 
points for our work. Kamal Siddiqui undertook a follow up study in the 
late 1990s to follow up on research he had undertaken as far back as 1977 
on poverty and rural social change in Narail district, which borders on 
Greater Faridpur (Siddiqui, 2000). His main findings were that local family 
structures had further nucleated, that factional politics had intensified, 
and the traditional samaj village community structure had declined. 
He also identified growing tensions between the generations, with the older 
members of  the community displaying an attachment to what he termed 
‘tradition and religious orthodoxy’ and the younger generation afflicted by 
what was in his view a more ‘decadent’ modernity that now gave greater 
emphasis to individualism over community solidarities. 
Kirsten Westergaard and Abul Hossain (2005) revisited a village in 
Bogra district in north-western Bangladesh originally studied during 
the mid-1970s. They found that traditional patron-client relations as a 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































UPDATING THE POWER  
STRUCTURE CONTEXT 
CHAPTER 2
As we saw in Chapter 1, the local power structure has changed since the 
earlier study. This chapter provides a brief  contextual overview of  the 
changes. The earlier study began by mapping out the main formal and 
informal institutions of  the local power structure across five categories: 
administrative institutions, political institutions, formal civil society, 
informal civil society, and the judiciary (Table 1). This set of  structures set 
out in the table remains similar, though there have been some changes. 
We will briefly review these changes in turn.
2.1 Administrative institutions
The three tier system of  local government at the level of  Upazila, 
Union and Ward has continued to evolve. When we carried out the 
earlier study, we found that the Union Parishad was the centre of  local 
development activities. The most important tier of  local government, the 
UP is responsible for the administration of  government departmental 
activities at the local level, the maintenance of  public order, the provision 
of  public welfare services, and the implementation of  economic and 
social development programmes (Siddiqui and Ahmed 2016).11 UP 
representatives were not primarily identified as party political leaders, 
but were also viewed by people as social and civil society leaders as well. 
We found there was frequent UP level interaction with NGOs and civil 
society, sometimes bringing positive outcomes for poor people. However, 
we found that the UP is less powerful today than in the earlier study. 
While we saw earlier that local MPs were often involved with local decision-
making they were not the controlling authority that we find them to be today. 
11  The UP system was originally created in 1870 by the British colonial authorities.
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to these meetings had been implemented, focus group discussions 
indicated that the meetings tend to be formal and male-dominated with 
few opportunities for meaningful participation by woman members. 
This finding is in keeping with other studies such as Chowdhury (2015) 
who found that while a modest start has been made in promoting the 
principles of  grassroots citizen participation in local planning and 
budgeting, the reality on the ground is that lack of  resources, patriarchal 
norms, and vested political interests are each major factors that limit 
opportunities for ordinary citizens to engage meaningfully in these 
new ‘spaces’.
The UPZ is supposed to be active in local development and provide 
oversight of  the UPs.13 Chairs have been elected in two national level 
sub-district elections held since our earlier study (in 2009 and 2014) but 
in practice these elected Chairs have few resources and little power with 
which to act. Indeed, successive governments have struggled to know what 
to do with the sub-district system. Abolished by the BNP in 1991, the UPZ 
was revived by the AL in 1998, with the local MP in an advisory role. 
The 2008 Upazila Parishad Ordnance removed the MP’s role, creating two 
new elected positions of  Vice Chairpersons (one female), and stipulated 
30% reserved female seats. However, when elections were held in April 2009 
the MP’s advisory role was reinstated. 
Today’s UPZ continues to serve more as a mechanism to consolidate 
clientelist political support by the ruling party than as a genuine attempt at 
decentralised democracy. One study found that ‘the outcome will remain 
poor if  the government is not sincere enough to make the system more 
accountable and responsive and merely uses it as a tool in consolidating its 
political foundation…’ (Ahmed et al, 2010). The Zila has never been fully 
activated, and this has not changed. There have never been elections held 
for District Committees or Chairs, with the Zila Chair simply selected as 
a government political appointee. The District Commissioner (DC) is an 
administrative appointment within the civil service. There are some small 
budget made available by central government at this level, but the District 
tier of  local government remain relatively inactive. Both the UPZ and the 
13  The Upazila sub-district had been created by General H.M. Ershad in 1982 primarily 
as a tool for his unelected military government to strengthen political control over local 
areas. Initially intended to become the key unit of  local government it never developed 
into this role because central governments fear that it will serve as a basis for local 
political opposition. It mobilizes few local resources, remaining fully dependent on central 
government patronage. 
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The 2009 Local Government (Union Parishad) Act is the most significant 
formal administrative change since our earlier study and aimed to enhance 
local participation and improve the local accountability of  the UPs. 
Implemented in 2011 the Act brought new local level planning arrangements 
designed to enhance social accountability through the introduction of  Ward 
sabha and Open Budget Meetings (Unmukto Budget Shawa). This was it was 
hoped would open up new space for citizen involvement in participatory 
budgeting, with anyone from each Ward able to attend and participate. 
The UPs would now also provide more information and services locally, 
including issuing documents and certificates. The Act also made provision 
for representatives of  non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to play 
a role in planning and budgeting.12 The Act also introduced a Citizen 
Charter to provide transparent information about the UP’s responsibilities 
in relation to service provision and rights of  citizens, aligned with the Right 
to Information Act that was also passed in 2009. 
In theory, the new Ward sabha is intended to facilitate improved 
local participation in local governance and promote productivity. 
It has a large number of  formal functions (including inspiring people to 
undertake economic activities, raising awareness around violence against 
women, and implementing local self-help projects). Its main activity is 
to plan local development and infrastructure repair schemes, draw up 
lists of  local people eligible for assistance from government, and provide 
community level information to the UP, such as details of  births and deaths. 
Ward sabha are supposed to take place twice a year in an open meeting, 
convened and chaired by the UP member from that ward, with the woman 
UP member serving as adviser to the meeting. However, the functioning 
of  the Ward Sabha system during the five years of  its operation has 
generally been judged as ‘not very encouraging’ overall (Ahmed, 2016, p.2). 
This was largely confirmed in our findings.
We learned that in our rural study areas that Ward meetings had taken 
place in each of  the nine wards around once a year, and had in some cases 
helped identify local needs for possible projects. But confirming Ahmed 
(2016) we found that most attendees tended to be safety net beneficiaries 
and clients who were there primarily to vote in favour of  patrons. 
While we found that the appointment of  women UP member advisers 
12  Another difference between 2004 and today is the demise of  the normal and weak 
Gram Sarkar village government system, which earlier BNP governments had attempted 
to introduce.
Local projects require the formation of  a seven-member Project 
Implementation Committee (PIC). At the time of  the earlier study, a UP 
member was always required to serve as chair of  the committee, which 
usefully provided a measure of  local level accountability. This has now been 
changed. Since the majority of  funds for local expenditure are now being 
brought in through the MP’s personal channels, more room for manoeuvre 
was required. This change means that local ruling party people can now 
more easily bypass the UP, particularly if  its elected leader is inconveniently 
affiliated to another party or faction, and make resource allocations and 
local development projects decisions independently. 
In 2004 we had also found that Upazila Development Coordination 
Committees (UDCCs) were playing useful roles in local development 
processes, reviewing prioritising different proposals from the UPs, the 
Wards and from the other government line agencies. Today they are merely 
a formality. Before, the UDCCs were chaired in rotation by UP Chairmen 
(since there were no elected UPZ chairs at that time), providing the UPs with 
access to the local development budget and the chance to set local priorities. 
Today, our findings indicate that the UDCC has become less relevant since 
the bulk of  development resources now come directly through the MP.
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District (Zila) continue to play relatively low-level roles. 
In order to address these shortcomings, extensive externally resourced 
capacity building support has been provided to the UPs and UPZs, 
including through the Union Parishad Governance Project 2011-2016 
(UPGP) and the Upazila Parishad Governance Project 2011-2016 (UZGP). 
These donor-supported programmes provide training and fiscal support 
to UP/UPZ so they can better assist line ministries plan, resource and 
deliver local services with the aim of  improved local synergies around local 
development and democratization. Both aim to add value to the large WB-
supported Local Government Support Programme (LGSP 2) that focuses 
on local governance work, capacity building, fiscal innovation, regulatory 
improvements and identifying best practice.
In Greater Faridpur we found that the bulk of  local development 
work continues to be carried out with resources provided by central 
government and through international donor-supported projects. 
The Ministries provide government revenue money to the UPs for the Annual 
Development Programme (ADP) budget, covering a range of  expenditures. 
The largest proportion is for infrastructure and roads and is provided through 
the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED).14 Test Relief  is food 
for work provided under the Ministry of  Food and Disaster Management. 
A smaller proportion of  overall central resources is provided by the Social 
Welfare Department for various social protection schemes. Since 2009 there 
has also been an MP’s fund of  around Tk3 crore annually. This is money for 
the ADP budget over which the MP has sole rights. Occasionally, additional 
resources are provided to MPs by the Prime Minister and by Parliament as 
gifts at election time or festivals, or as additional TR in times of  hardship. 
This gives MPs additional influence in local communities through distributing 
patronage resources to followers. This latter channel is particularly open to 
abuse, with few checks and balances. Local taxes are collected at UP level 
such as property (holding) tax, land sales tax, and bazar lease tax, as well 
as water body leasing fees, licenses for rickshaws and money from shops 
and small industries. However, these locally collected resources form only a 
tiny proportion of  the spent at UP level, with the bulk coming from 
central funding. 
14  The MP has a strong influence over LGED funds for larger scale works such as 
embankment, bridge and major feeder road repairs. LGSP funds for local works are sent 
directly to a Union account in order to minimise bureaucratic and political interference. 
However, these funds are relatively small and used only for minor works, such as 
construction and repair of  culverts.
Social protection has expanded, but is also subject to the politicisation 
pressures mentioned. The NSSS with its 145 safety net measures is intended 
to consolidate multiple existing programmes and to extend a wider range of  
social protection instruments to poor and vulnerable populations. Formally, 
it is the UP that is supposed to make decisions about who should be entitled 
receive payments, but this function is subject to patron-client allegiances and 
to growing politicization. For example, it was reported that in our rural areas 
local level ruling party leaders with the support of  the MP are able to reserve 
up to 50% of  social safety net resources for distribution to their supporters, 
leaving the UP with less to allocate than before.
2.2 Political institutions
As we have seen, the political situation has changed so that a single ruling 
party now dominates. The Awami League has worked hard to strengthen 
its local power base and largely eliminated BNP and Jama’at Islami (JI) that 
formed the main opposition. 
Fieldwork coincided with UP elections that were held in a staged process 
across the country between January and June 2016. The tradition had been 
for these to be conducted primarily as local elections based on personal 
reputation and power rather than on formal political party affiliation and 
outside political party support. The controversial use of  party affiliations 
this time around is believed to have contributed to heightened local tensions, 
both between AL and residual opposition, and among different AL factions. 
Nationally, the 2016 UP elections were reported to have been the most 
violent local elections the country has ever held. More than 100 people were 
reported killed in election violence across the country, and many more badly 
injured. Only around one third of  elections were estimated to have been free 
and fair. However, there were only a few reports of  violence in our areas 
compared to elsewhere. 
In the three Greater Faridpur study areas, the small amount of  violence 
that occurred this year was mostly the result of  intra-AL factional conflict 
rather than between political parties as had sometimes occurred before.15 
Factionalism within the ruling party was exacerbated when local candidates 
whose party affiliation had previously been secondary to their local status 
15  In some areas of  the country it was reported in the press that local police were paid by 
local candidates from different parties to ensure a fair election, because they knew they 
would win in a fair contest, including a JI candidate in Satkhira in the south.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.3 Formal civil society
For many years Bangladesh was characterised as having a vibrant civil 
society sector, with a range of  development NGOs in particular playing key 
roles. For a variety of  reasons, including changing foreign donor policies, 
government restrictions, and organization and leadership problems among 
certain NGOs, the NGO sector has become less diverse than previously and 
more dominated by organizations providing economic support rather than 
rights-based or social mobilisation type development activities (Lewis 2017). 
The current government has also taken action to restrict civil society ‘space’. 
For example, a new law placing stronger restrictions on NGOs receiving 
foreign funding came into effect in October 201617 and action has also been 
taken against prominent journalists regarded as critical of  the government.18 
When we returned to Greater Faridpur, found that there was a changed 
composition of  local level NGO activities. Economic support from NGOs 
for small business and credit had increased, and there was less rights-based 
empowerment work around land, labour or gender inequality, or local group 
formation. Civil society is now dominated by more mainstream development 
NGOs engaged in forms of  business loan support and loan making. For 
example in the peri-urban village earlier more radical NGO activities 
were now almost entirely absent, despite the persistence of  longstanding 
rights issues. Nor did we find NGOs working to encourage representatives 
from poorer groups and women to seek election to local bodies in order 
to challenge domination by local elites as was the case earlier. This left a 
significant gap where formal ‘radical’ or rights-based civil society used to be. 
The only exception to this was some small scale single issue organisations, 
concerned with legal aid, or with disability rights. The situation was however 
somewhat different in the urban study location, where NGOs were a little 
more active in both economic support and community mobilization work.
The mainstream NGOs that we found are now giving larger loans to 
clients than before. For example, rickshaw pullers who were previously 
taking loans of  around Tk8 thousand are now able to access loans of  up to 
Tk50 thousand for the purchase of  new battery-driven models or ‘easy bike’ 
17  Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/19/bangladesh-new-law-
will-choke-civil-society (accessed May 19, 2017).
18  See for example the action taken against Mahfuz Anam, editor of  Prothom Alo and Daily 
Star newspapers (‘Bangladeshi editor who faced 83 lawsuits says press freedom under 
threat’, The Guardian, 18 May 2017, accessed 25 May 2017). 
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and reputation faced the imposition of  ‘official’ local candidates who 
had been selected centrally by the ruling party, or by the local MP. It was 
therefore common to find competition between the ‘official’ and the locally 
popular ‘rebel’ AL candidates, with their supporters coming into conflict as 
rival factions.
Table 2 summarises the formal political situation in each of  the three 
locations from the earlier study and updates these. Only in the well-
connected village was there a local elected official who was familiar to 
us from the earlier study: after serving four terms as UP Chair, he had 
been elected UPZ Chair in 2014. In 2004, all three local MPs had been 
BNP-affiliated, and this had also been the party of  government. Since 
the BNP did not contest the general election in 2014, all three local seats 
are now filled by AL MPs, as are two of  the local UPZ Chairs. Despite 
the dominance of  the AL nationally, each of  the three UP Chairs in our 
study villages were BNP-affiliated when we conducted the main fieldwork. 
This follows an earlier tradition that these individuals have remained first 
and foremost local leaders whose reputations has not rested primarily 
on their party links, but also on their standing in the local community.16 
We also find in the peri-urban and well-connected sites that like last time 
clan politics remains a feature of  local leadership.
UP and UPZ elections took place in 2011/2016 and 2009/2014 
respectively. This has begun to pose a problem for the MPs interested in 
extending AL political patronage and consolidating party support at UP level. 
To help them manage this, the MP in the remote study area has appointed 
an unofficial ‘coordinator’ to help bypass the UP Chair through constructing 
a special informal relationship (Box 9 below). This informal relationship 
took precedence over the formal structures of  elected local government and 
illustrates the way that the ruling party is extending its power locally. 
In the well-connected village, the UP Chair is a relative of  the AL 
UPZ Chair, which helps to cement their relationship. The MP is regarded 
unfavourably by both of  them, because he is from an opposing AL faction. 
However, in the latter case the 2016 election saw a new AL UP Chair 
elected, who was from the MP’s faction. 
16  This position subsequently changed, with a new AL UP Chair elected in the well-
connected village, and the peri-urban UP Chair announcing in May 2017 that he will 
soon affiliate to the AL.
such local institutions than was the case earlier. Finally, while last time 
we sometimes found evidence of  religious institutions such as Mosque or 
Temple Committees playing wider social roles – such as in shalish decisions 
– this was not found to be the case today. For example, we were informed 
that most imams these days are mostly concerned with prayers and funerals.
Other forms of  informal civil society action, such as community-level 
activism and local protest, were encountered and are discussed later in the 
study. Finally, the spread of  mobile phone technology and internet since our 
earlier study was striking and has also played a role in facilitating local level 
action.21
Greater Faridpur is an area of  Bangladesh that is reported to be less 
strictly religious than some other parts of  the country, and this was confirmed 
by religious attitudes and practices in each of  our study areas. Few women in 
the area wear the burqa, for example. While there are both Quomi (private, 
unregulated) madrasas and Alia government regulated ‘reformed’ madrasas in 
the area, these are not reported to be increasing their numbers, or growing 
in influence.22 Religious meetings such as waz mahfil events take place as 
they have always done, where proper religious practice in the community 
is encouraged and resources mobilized towards the maintenance of  local 
mosques and madrasas.23 Here we also found that there was an interface with 
local politics, with local MPs and other politicians invited as chief  guests and 
making financial donations to local religious groups as part of  their vote bank 
calculations. While not completely absent from our data, we found relatively 
few reports of  such meetings provoking tensions with for example members 
of  the Hindu community, as has sometimes been reported from elsewhere in 
the country (Uddin, 2006). 
21  The AL contested the 2008 election with the promise of  building a ‘Digital Bangladesh’. 
Some suggest this idea has caught the imagination of  the electorate, but others see 
it mainly as a strategy to capture and harness the power of  new communication 
technologies to political interests (Shoesmith and Genilo 2013).
22  There are around 16,000 Alia and 10,000 Quomi madrasas in Bangladesh, with around 
5.5 million and 1 million students respectively.
23  During the feedback discussions in Faridpur, one participant said that there were fewer 
cultural events than there were 10 years ago (such as plays and music) but more religious 
events.
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motorised rickshaws.19 We learned that such NGO support to local small 
business activity mainly works well, and it was generally found to be popular 
with members of  our focus groups.
2.4 Informal civil society
The boundary between formal and informal civil society is not clear-cut, 
but we deploy it here to consider local associational forms, loose action 
groupings, and traditional institutions. The ‘samaj’ is usually identified as the 
key traditional socio-religious institution at village level. Villages have for 
generations contained one or more of  these loose social groupings, made up 
of  communities of  households linked by kinship and shared neighbourhood 
space and headed by an elder or ‘matbar’. At the same time, the samaj has 
always been vulnerable to factional instability. This is the institutional 
space in which the shalish is convened, where informal arbitration by local 
leaders takes place around issues such as land disputes, marriage, political 
or religious tensions, allegations of  immoral behaviour, or political conflict. 
The samaj has also provided a platform for religious leaders to organise 
and integrate their activities, as well as serving as a local civil society 
space for community level activities around local school building, mosque 
maintenance, local infrastructure repair, and disaster response (Mannan 
2015). As reported in the earlier study, the samaj has been in decline, as 
other researchers have noted. For example, Iqbal (2017) describes ‘a 
fragmentary and retreating samaj in the contemporary public sphere’. 
The remnants of  the samaj persist in the form of  local institutions of  
traditional authority such as the shalish (although these have evolved and 
changed), and in the Quomi madrasa religious school system, which as Iqbal 
(2017) also suggests, exist mainly outside the control of  the modern state and 
civil society (to the concern of  both).20
Other types of  semi-formal civil society actor include Business 
Associations and Bazar Committees. We saw in the earlier report how 
these were often vulnerable to political capture, but it was apparent from 
our new data that the ruling party has now established a tighter hold on 
19  There now about 250 auto rickshaws operating in two stands in the town, with 
associations which are controlled by the ruling party.
20  There are two types: Aliya reformed government approved madrasas that also teach 
secular subjects, and Quomi unregulated ones. The latter are traditional in the sense they 





COMMUNITY LEVEL PERSPECTIVES: 
MAIN FINDINGS FROM THE 2016 DATA
CHAPTER 3
This chapter reports on the main findings from the interviews and focus 
group discussions in each of  our four study areas. It draws out key themes 
and links these with issues raised in the secondary literature that was analysed 
in the desk study phase of  the research. For each site, the background data is 
first updated and compared to the situation we had encountered during the 
2004 fieldwork, and then the main findings are summarised. The exception 
is in the case of  the urban study site, which was not part of  the earlier study.
3.1 The peri-urban village
In the peri-urban village, which is close to the main district town, we had 
found last time a prosperous local economy in which households previously 
dependent on agriculture were slowly moving into non-agricultural 
livelihoods such as shop keeping and rickshaw pulling. This time we found 
continued signs of  increasing prosperity and new economic dynamism, 
reflecting improved communications and market access. 
Just as Jansen and Rahman (2011) had found in their return to Manikganj 
district, we encountered better infrastructure, increasing non-agricultural 
employment, and successful out-migration. Both men and women have 
gained improved access to economic opportunities, to education and to 
health services. People tell us that agriculture has become less profitable and 
is contributing a declining proportion to household incomes. Construction 
and transportation and other informal sector businesses are booming. For 
example, it was immediately noticeable that many rickshaw pullers have 
upgraded their vehicles to new motorised models. They have been assisted 
in this in many cases through the provision of  NGO credit loans, which have 
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2.5 Judiciary
We found in the earlier study that local political leaders, elders and civil 
society leaders were increasingly working together to produce outcomes 
that were generally viewed as fair within the community. Today the picture 
has changed and become more politicised. The longstanding shalish dispute 
settlement system remains central but has continued to evolve and change 
during the last decade. Ruling party leaders attend and dominate shalish and 
these days it is common for UP Chairs to be absent. There is no multi-party 
participation and less of  a role for both the UP members and matbars. In the 
peri-urban village, for example, there were allegations that bribes must now 
usually be paid in order to receive favourable outcomes, and that as a result 
fewer people were seeking justice through the shalish.24 
More serious disputes, such as those over land, tend to be resolved at 
the UPZ level with local officials and/or party people present. The power 
of  traditional local leaders has continued to decline. One person remarked 
‘There is little importance given to matbars these days. If  an incident occurs on a land 
issue or other kind of  conflict, they don’t get involved, because no one shows them much 
respect any more.’
In all communities, it was reported that earlier problems of  police 
corruption and extortion had improved under the AL government. 
We learned from the rural locations that the official Village Court system 
is rarely used.
24  However, we also learned that the culture of  penalties imposed by shalish was changing.  
A financial penalty is increasingly preferred to corporal punishment such as caning, 
which was previously more common.
sector is controlled by one large association in Faridpur town that is linked to 
the AL, with a total of  about 5000 rickshaws. Its President is a District level 
activist and former chair of  the AL student wing Central Committee.
Issues and findings
The perception that economic progress has been experienced by all groups, 
but has occurred alongside a consolidation of  ruling party power, came 
across strongly from the data. There were different factions and political 
affiliations apparent within focus groups, with for example among the non-
poor men five individuals now happy to recognise the power of  the ruling 
party, but two who still retained loyalty to the elected BNP chair.
From the focus group discussion with poor women it was confirmed that 
compared to before the local AL activists are more powerful in decisions 
around local resource distribution than the locally elected leaders linked 
to the BNP. They told us that although the BNP UP chairman remains 
popular locally and ‘tries to provide’ UP services fairly, it is now the local 
AL union level leader who oversees delivery of  welfare payments, relief  and 
other resources. They also confirmed that the MP is able to influence the 
UP through the use of  informal coordinators. Box 1 describes an example 
of  one way the ruling party is increasing its power locally over common 
property resources by subverting local formal institutions and informal 
traditions in favour of  its supporters. 
Box 1: Normal rules do not apply: party leaders and local water rights
We learned of one water body in the area is controlled by the Bangladesh Water 
Development Board (BWDB) and leased out each year for fishing. The normal 
arrangement for countless years has been that the UP arranges for an annual 
advertisement for leasing to be distributed, and any interested fisher folk groups 
are able to bid for rights to fish in the water body. The highest bidder is granted 
access to the fishing rights for the season. However, ruling party political power 
holders have recently started to ignore the tradition, and have forbidden local 
groups from making bids. The leader of the local Jubo League (the youth front 
of the ruling AL political party) has led the way in blocking this process in his 
own interest. He and his followers have found a way to take control the lease of 
the water body for last five years. We learned that he believed head the support 
of the MP to do this. Political pressure can therefore now be successfully 
exerted to ensure that the BDWB ignores all other applications in favour of this 
particular one - such that normal rules do not apply.
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expanded in scope and scale.25 Migration includes national level migration 
for factory work in Dhaka and other urban centres, and at the international 
level increased numbers of  women going for work to the Middle East as 
domestic servants.
The same BNP-affiliated UP Chairman remained in post as before. 
There was no election took place in 2016 since the area is scheduled to 
join the City Corporation in 2017 and will lose its UP. At the time of  the 
fieldwork, the UP Chair’s level of  local influence was clearly much lower 
than before. Firstly, this is because the UP now controls fewer development 
resources than before, with an Annual Development Plan (ADP) budget 
totalling only about one fifth of  what had been in 2004. Second, while today 
there are more social safety net programmes available for marginalised 
social groups (such as elderly, poor, widows, people with disabilities) than 
before, the UP Chair has less control over their allocation and provision. 
Instead, it is the MP and his associates who mainly make these 
decisions. An increasing proportion is diverted to local ruling party leaders 
for distribution to their supporters. The result is that the UP chair’s 
formal authority has gradually become weakened by informal ‘bypassing’ 
arrangements. For example, there is a local AL coordinator accountable 
to the MP who organises local development projects largely outside the 
formal UP system. The MP has additional power because he also has a 
ministerial position that gives him influence over local external donor-
funded infrastructure work.26 The power of  the opposition’s patron-client 
networks has declined as AL patronage has become strengthened.
The local business sector in Greater Faridpur is mixed in terms of  scales, 
sectors and ownership. We were informed that many enterprises continue 
to be owned by established Hindu business families, some with businesses 
several generations old. Business associations do not operate independently 
of  political groups, and we found that private sector associations have also 
been ‘captured’ by the ruling party. For example, most of  the auto rickshaw 
25  The UP cannot issue official licenses since the new battery-driven vehicles are not yet 
legal on the roads. Existing interests such as local bus and other road transport groups 
also oppose licensing. An unofficial solution has been found with the creation by local 
AL leaders of  a new Vehicle Owners Association, with the backing of  the MP. The 
consequent loss of  transport license fee income further weakens the UP. 
26  Some projects have arrangements in place to try to minimise interference form MPs, 
such as World Bank resources for local government strengthening that flow directly to the 
UP into a special account.
from the group ensuring that they were unable to pay off the police and avoid 
sentence. Police cooperation in this case proved very important. The informal 
tolls were successfully eliminated. With this particular problem solved, the 
informal civil society group then faded away.
  
Non-poor women are particularly positive about the business 
opportunities being provided by NGO loans and training, and contribution 
to livelihoods such as cattle and goat rearing and poultry. One woman told 
us about her experiences of  building a small cattle rearing business, with the 
support and encouragement of  her husband. Over a period of  more than 10 
years she has built up a herd of  eleven cows and is able to sell 20-30 litres of  
milk a day. Using the dung from the cows she is also now producing organic 
manure for sale, and renting out a breeding bull. Using this income she has 
been able to build a good livelihood, including sending her two daughters to 
school. She has gone on to set up a savings and loan cooperative group with 
25 members from among her neighbours.
They took a favourable view of  the UPZ Women’s Development Forum 
(WDF, introduced in 2015) that is composed of  elected UP women members. 
The Forum is intended to influence the allocation of  public resources towards 
benefitting women with public works. They also explained that most local 
disputes are settled informally, rather than through the Village Court system. 
There is agreement that both NGO campaigns and legislation such as the 
2010 Family Violence Prevention and Protection Act (2010) has reduced 
the prevalence of  these offences. We also understood that a high proportion 
of  girls are now educated in this community and that access to education 
has improved considerably since the mid-2000s, with women now finding 
employment locally as teachers and as NGO workers.
While most groups mentioned the wider dominance of  the ruling 
party, non-poor men were particularly concerned about the rise of  ‘party 
power’ as a force that has undermined the authority of  the matbars. 
This resonates with the concept of  ‘partyarchy’ used by Hassan (2013, p.13) 
where he refers to the dominance of  political party patronage networks in 
determining people’s access to opportunities and resources. This loss of  
traditional authority is not just due to politicization, but also a result of  
inter-generational social changes in attitudes visible in the other locations as 
well (including the urban study area) that includes concerns about declining 
respect for elders. One person commented to us that ‘young people are no longer 
being prepared to obey senior citizens’.
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These days the local MP holds more power than before. Those loyal to 
the UP Chair, whom they described as ‘polite and well mannered’, claim that he is 
now increasingly bypassed in decision making by unruly AL activists who by 
contrast ‘get things done by shouting and threatening’, supported in the background 
by the MP. The non-poor men explain that despite being defeated when he 
stood for Chair at the last elections in 2011, in practice the local AL president 
and not the UP Chair is the most powerful person in the local area. He has 
informal influence over the UP. For example, he conducts the most important 
shalish, such as those concerning local land disputes.
While formal civil society in the form of  radical NGO activity may be 
less common, we found examples suggesting that the capacity exists for 
informal types of  civil society action to challenge local abuses of  power (Box 
2). The form of  such action may be unruly or ‘uncivil’ in its use of  force 
and threat. People try to resist infringement of  their rights when they occur 
and they sometimes succeed in gaining redress. For example we heard that 
the main local AL leader, who had formerly been the elected president of  
the local High School’s Management Committee, had without good reason 
refused some children the opportunity to re-take exams and it was implied 
that this was for political reasons. As a result, he failed to secure re-election 
to the Committee, suggesting a level of  community level power to influence 
local services. 
Box 2: Local civil society: neighbourhood watch or vigilante group?
The embankment’s sluice gate creates a popular crossing point. It is also a 
place where local gangs have long attempted to collect illegal tolls by preying on 
those trying to get across. There was a particular case a few years ago during 
the rainy season when members of a gang interfered with the activities of local 
fishermen working in the waterlogged areas located on the southern side of 
the embankment. Following this trouble a violent clash took place between the 
fisher folk and gang members after Friday prayers. Several people were injured. 
Afterwards, two criminal cases were field with the police. The same day local 
people with the help of a former UP Chairman, formed a Village Defence Group 
to protect themselves and seek justice, and they began patrolling the area. 
They petitioned the police and at a meeting organized at the local government 
Primary School, the Police Chief assured local people there would be full 
police cooperation. The group also talked to the local Mosque Committee who 
agreed to cooperate. Messages were broadcast across the community using 
the Mosque’s loudspeaker to warn the remaining gang members to desist. 
Two gang members were soon arrested, and other arrests followed. The gang 
members were sentenced to imprisonment in some cases, with pressure 
approval of  the creation of  the Child Marriage Protection Committee that 
operates at the UP, and one person recounted to us the case of  a successful 
intervention after a complaint was made by the father of  an under-age girl 
who had eloped with an under-age boy in Class 9.27   
3.2 The well-connected village
In our earlier study, this was an area also characterised by a high degree of  
economic and social dynamism. Today, we find the quality of  infrastructure 
has further improved and it is striking that the area today resembles the 
peri-urban study area far more than it had done back in 2004. Better 
living standards are reflected in the far smarter and more ‘urban’ clothes 
that we observed people wearing today. There are now extensive electricity 
connections to people’s houses, when these were only to be found in the 
bazar last time. The bazar itself  has also grown substantially in size and 
turnover. Unlike before, there are few complaints made by any of  the four 
sets of  focus group members about rising food prices.
Increased economic opportunities are also reported in this area, 
including through the growth of  migration to the Middle East (for both men 
and women). As in the peri-urban village, people are more connected than 
before with international migration opportunities. This has had the effect of  
reducing people’s vulnerability to criminal brokers and intermediaries. Some 
have been assisted by migration loans from NGOs such as BRAC. 
Unlike before, we did not encounter NGOs engaged in social mobilization 
work around land rights issues. We had been particularly interested in two 
sets of  civil society related findings from our study last time: that local UP 
leaders had become frustrated with NGO credit lending that was causing 
some people loan payment problems and causing disputes in the community 
that they were asked to settle; and that they were more supportive of  certain 
radical NGOs attempting to settle landless people on illegally occupied local 
khas land and helping them to establish proper land rights (building win-win 
coalitions that provided assistance to local poor households and generated 
future votes).
27  The government’s Child Marriage Restraint Act (2016) has strengthened law 
enforcement on this issue, but it has also been criticised for making provision for ‘special 
circumstances’ such as accidental pregnancy that would allow marriage at a younger 
age to protect ‘honour’ (“Bangladesh child marriage law could violate girls’ rights”, 
Plan International, 7 February 2017, https://plan-international.org/news/2017-02-06-
bangladesh-child-marriage-law-could-violate-girls-rights, accessed 30 June 2017).
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While these men pointed to generally positive aspects of  local economic 
changes, they also told us that growth was creating higher land prices by 
putting pressure on finite local resources. This means that there is a need to 
ensure that the costs of  a land dispute are minimised by a fair judgment by 
local leaders: ‘Leaders are there to help people and they have links with the thana (police 
station). That’s why people try to keep good relations with them. Nobody wants to lose out 
in a land-related shalish.’ 
There is reported to be relatively good community relationships in the 
area. For example, a settled ‘river gypsy’ minority community have to some 
extent been integrated into the local power structure (see Box 3 below). This 
could be taken as an example that the patronage networks used by the AL to 
consolidate its power can have a socially inclusive character.
Box 3: A local informal AL ‘coordinator’ from the local minority community
The once nomadic but now long-settled local river gypsy community are 
housed on squatted land along both sides of a nearby railway line. On this 
land they are increasingly joined by local people escaping river erosion in 
nearby areas and many now live side by side. We met a local activist lawyer 
who is originally from this minority community. He has been a longstanding 
AL leader since his student days, worked as a lawyer since 2011, and a 
former college president and former UP member. There have been attempts 
to move the bepari community off the railway land from time to time, but he 
has so far managed to prevent their eviction. He convinced the local MP to 
come to a community meeting and secured an agreement to protect their 
rights. With the support also of the UPZ Chairman he has come to serve as an 
informal ‘coordinator’ for this Union and now oversees many of the area’s local 
development projects. He explained to us that using both MP and UP funds he 
is able to undertake Madrasa, Temple, Mosque, and School projects along with 
local road maintenance work. During the BNP regime he told us there were far 
fewer local roads, but that now the government is able to provide more good 
quality roads in the area. A new bridge over the river near the UPZ has also 
been constructed. He explained to us that a new Marine College building and a 
riverside tourist infrastructure structure are also in the offing. He also told us that 
he is very proud of his minority community and has seen many of them go on to 
build successful small businesses in the area.
Overall, people reported that law and order has improved, and that 
shalish decisions are generally fair and timely, with the local tradition of  
holding an informal and inclusive shalish (including participation from 
women UP members) continuing from last time. There was widespread 
Poor women gave a view of  the local power structure that placed at its 
centre the formal power of  male office holders. The UPZ chair was seen 
as the most powerful individual in their community since he was affiliated 
with the ruling party and had been elected as UP Chair four times in 
this area. He is described as being honest and running a fair shalish. 
Most local disputes tend to be successfully resolved through this informal 
system, involving some combination of  the UPZ and UP chairs, UP 
members, village elders, and members of  the Bazar Committee. 
As an example of  why the UPZ Chair’s judgment is respected, we heard 
that he had acted to support a widow living on a small plot of  government 
khas land for 10 years who had suddenly faced action by local youths to 
force her off the land. He intervened to prevent them from stealing the 
land. However, in another case a widowed woman had tried to formally 
register land that she had inherited from her deceased father in law (legally 
purchased from the UP chair’s uncle) but was unable to do so. 
Women’s property rights continue to be difficult to enforce, with many 
people in all the study sites reluctant to make it possible for women to 
inherit paternal land, even though this is her right under the law. Even when 
women do secure some land, it can be difficult to hold onto. One woman 
told us that in her view poor women do not yet have strong enough land 
rights in cases like this: ‘Rich people are powerful and they have ‘money power’. 
We poor people are unable to challenge the rich, even when they are breaking the law’. 
When it comes to local public services, ordinary people’s access here 
is once again personalised and increasingly party-linked. Road repair and 
renovation projects are directed towards leaders and activists of  the ruling 
party. The UP chair and members these days implement only a small 
proportion of  such projects. The UP’s Standing Committees, which are 
supposed to widen local decision making ensure effective oversight of  local 
development activities, are generally less active than we found them during 
the earlier study (which was the case in each of  our study areas). 
A key person discussed by poor women was Mr B., the UP member 
who allocates social ‘safety net’ resources and decides who is eligible the 
‘40 Days’ employment support programme29, Test Relief  (a programme 
29  The Employment Generation Programme for the Poorest (EGPP) was established as 
a safety net programme by the government in 2008 to provide 40 days of  short-term 
employment support each year through public works. One third of  recipients are women.
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Like last time, we found that there is relative harmony among different 
ethnic and religious communities in the locality. In particular there are 
many Hindu communities in this area and no violence was reported 
between Hindu and majority Muslim during the past ten years.28 One of  
the non-poor women focus group explained that it is common for Muslim 
families to invite Hindus to their home during Eid, and for Hindus to invite 
Muslims during Puja, and she said that most people do not think it right to 
differentiate between Hindu or Muslim. However, some people in the focus 
groups did raise some minor concerns about a deteriorating law and order 
situation in the locality in relation to small-scale theft and harassment.
Issues and findings
The focus group discussions expressed a mainly positive view of  the 
economic opportunities afforded to them by the country’s higher growth 
economy. One woman from the poor focus group with two sons told us that 
one has gone to Dhaka to work in a factory and that another now has a small 
shop there. Another told us of  her son working in construction in Dhaka. 
There has also been some international migration from this community to 
the Middle East (including Qatar and Jordan) but it was not clear what the 
mix of  migrants was between the poor or non-poor families. 
The women we heard from were generally very positive about the scale 
and terms of  the NGO loans available for starting up small enterprises (to 
the value of  around one lakh Taka) and the micro-credit loans that NGOs 
make available (which range from Tk10-60,000). Unlike in 2004, we did 
not hear complaints about unreasonable loan repayment pressures or loan 
‘recycling’ (people taking loans and then ‘lending on’ to other people in order 
to make money). Nor did we hear about people taking several loans from 
more than one organization, and getting into difficulty with repayments. 
From the non-poor women we also learned that around a dozen women and 
men from this village have gone to Dhaka to work in garment factories. One 
person has migrated to Malaysia using a special migration loan of  Tk5 lakh 
from an NGO, which is repaid in instalments along with each remittance 
sent. Although people told us they saw value in NGOs as loan providers, 
little role for NGOs was envisaged beyond this – such as becoming more 
involved with shalish, or protecting human rights. 
28  However, we did hear of  a land-grabbing case in which a wealthy Hindu land owning 
family have recently been deprived of  some of  their land by political interests (including 
an MP and his supporters) so that it could be used for industrial purposes.
In discussing their views of  the power structure, the poor male group told 
us that powerful local families continue to hold power in the community, but 
that these are now more closely linked not just to elected local officials but 
also to political parties. The UPZ Chair sits at the top of  the local power 
structure, and although he is AL affiliated he manages to maintain a fairly 
good relationship with the UP Chair, who is BNP-affiliated. One dimension 
that makes this easier is that they are relatives (uncle/nephew). As a former 
UP Chair from this community, the UPZ Chair has previously worked with 
the current UP Chair and the latter’s reputation has been enhanced by their 
association. Another is that the local MP is unpopular here (he seen by many 
people as predatory and unruly) and appears to be part of  a different AL 
faction, and a rival of  the UPZ Chair. Nevertheless, quite a lot of  local 
power is invested in the informal role of  local ruling party activists. The 
local AL leader is both a relative of  the UPZ Chair and a former ‘freedom 
fighter’ (from the 1971 Liberation War) and seen by the poor groups as 
particularly powerful, despite having no formal status in the UP or UPZ.
The poor men’s focus group also confirmed that the modernised informal 
shalish system was relatively effective and inclusive (as we had reported last 
time). But some people were concerned about the growing dominance of  
local ruling party activists over more traditional local leaders. It was reported 
that it is not unusual for convened by leaders of  the Chhatra League AL 
student wing, with local officials present. This is because the UP chair is a 
BNP member whose authority is now bypassed wherever possible.30 One 
person remarked: ‘Whatever the president and secretary of  the Chhatra League say, 
the UP chairman and members tend to carry it out’. However, once again there 
were different views expressed in the group about this and another view was 
that only if  UP members were from the ruling party would they involve the 
Chhatra League. 
Some alleged that MPs only give key jobs and responsibilities to people 
within their own party and not those affiliated to the opposition, and that an 
informal payment often needs to be made in order to secure even small jobs. 
We were told of  many such alleged cases, including a rumour that a recent 
appointment to a maid’s job at a local college had required a substantial 
informal payment to be made via the college’s Management Committee. 
30  The non-poor male focus group perceived that while the local Mosque and Temple 
Committees were active in religious activities, their roles in wider community institutions 
was not extensive and probably declining as the power of  the ruling party has increased. 
For example, while they were invited to take part in some shalish work their role was seen as 
largely ornamental and their voices did not generally count for much in decision-making.
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offering food for small scale work like pond cleaning and road repairs) and 
other types of  welfare programme. The UP member is mostly seen as fair-
minded, but there are some critical comments made about some needy 
people in the community who are unable to access what they see as their due 
social security entitlements. For example, we heard about a woman with two 
disabled children unable to access an allowance, and another similar case of  
a woman entitled to maternity payments.
The poor male focus group was made up of  people with little or no owned 
land whose livelihoods came primarily from rickshaw pulling, labouring or 
sharecropping work. All agreed that their financial positions are stronger 
than they were ten years ago. They said that agricultural income had been 
enhanced by producing more high value winter crops such as onion, garlic 
and vegetables in addition to paddy, and by more opportunities in small-
scale agribusiness. The new motorised pedal rickshaws and the improved 
auto rickshaws are also more profitable. Finally, they too explained 
that international migration has made a significant difference to local 
livelihoods, so that ‘five times as many people’ were able to access migration 
opportunities than was the case 10 years ago. Around 60 people from the 
village are now believed to work overseas and are sending remittances to 
local households (see Box 4).
Box 4: International migration loans from NGOs
One focus group member was keen to talk to us about his positive experience 
with an international migration loan from BRAC Bank. Mr K is from a middle 
class household. He has one son who works for the Bangladesh Border Guard 
(BGB) and another who has worked in Saudi Arabia since 2015. In order 
to facilitate this migration, he explained that he needed a total of Tk9 lakhs, 
which is a huge amount of money for a rural household. He had heard that 
BRAC Bank had established a loan programme for international job seekers, 
and so went to talk to the manager, later submitting the required paperwork. 
BRAC Bank gave him a Tk2 lakh loan, which he was able to supplement by 
mortgaging some of his family land, selling some trees and taking an additional 
loan from his son-in-law. We learned that BRAC Bank’s migration loan is a 
recently introduced scheme that is having an impact in many rural areas, with 
an easy payment scheme that allows the borrower to repay money in easy 
instalments. In the village there are reports of at least five other people getting 
this type of loan and that they are very satisfied with the scheme.
both poor men and poor women discussed the fact that the practice continued 
and officials could do little to prevent it. Underage marriages are sometimes 
conducted in secret and can remain unregistered, so that the UNO remains 
unaware of  them. The UP is unlikely to report them. There are believed to be 
50 or 60 child marriages in this village (see Box 5).
When it comes to accessing welfare services the male poor group 
confirms the view that the distribution of  VGD cards and social safety net 
entitlement cards remains personalised as before, but has now also become 
more politicised. The UP members draw up lists of  those people eligible, but 
now the UP chair also puts aside a proportion (believed to be around 50%) 
for distribution among local party leaders and activists. When it comes to the 
leasing of  local water bodies and other resources such as the market license 
allocations, we heard that opposition leaders know that at the moment it is 
futile to participate since the ruling party controls the process.
For the non-poor women, critical insights were offered regarding the value 
of  the reserved seat appointed female UP member. They were unanimously 
of  the view that she was answerable mainly to the male UP officials and 
played little role in the Standing Committees, or in wider decision-making. 
They also valued the UNO’s role as School Inspector, something that 
was not mentioned by other groups. However, they complained about the 
way jobs at the High School were allocated, based on informal payments. 
We were told for example that it had been alleged that Tk3 lakhs had 
changed hands to secure the post of  Head Teacher, and Tk50 thousand for 
an Assistant Teacher job. There was a requirement for a formal recruitment 
test for such appointments, they explained, but the result for each candidate 
counted for nothing. We also heard from the discussion that the MP is 
directly involved in such appointments, and that informal payments are 
believed to take place between MP, the School Principal and members of  
the School Management Committee.
Most people mentioned the relatively good law and order situation in 
the area, but voiced concerns about the ruling party control of  the police 
leading to cases where there was only a partial application of  the law. For 
example, one participant recounted a story of  a robbery at her house when 
she had been at home. She had managed to phone a local teacher who 
brought help and the ten or so thieves had fled, taking jewellery and money. 
The family went to the police to file a case, but found they were pressured a 
few days later due to the connections of  some of  those involved to change 
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The AL also has a direct link to the Bazar Committee through its President, 
a ruling party local leader and businessman who has good connections to 
the UPZ Chairman. Management of  the committee is tendered each year 
and government people end up with the lowest bid and control the market 
and its revenue (‘the people in power guard the tender box’, it was said). There is 
similar control of  local water bodies and land leases. In one reported case, a 
large area of  land that earlier had been leased to a group of  landless people 
during the BNP government period is now completely controlled by an AL 
leader. The landless household group no longer have access to it.
The space for organising political opposition and protest has become 
narrower. Opposition activists in this community say they are effectively 
prevented from organising demonstrations or other local action through the 
AL’s control of  the local police. They say the police are likely to harass 
them if  they try to organise an open event. If  they try to organise more ‘low 
key’ activities, they say that in today’s political climate they may risk being 
labelled by the police as extremists or terrorists, and face the use of  force by 
police to repress meetings. 
While the research was going on there was an example that illustrates 
continuing problems around forms of  day to day sexual harassment, but 
also a favourable public settlement and outcome. This was a case of  stalking 
of  a female student at a local school, who was regularly threatened by a 
group of  local boys as she walked home from school, and later subjected 
to unwelcome calls from these boys on her mobile phone. With the help of  
her brother who started to accompany her to school, she was able to make a 
complaint to her teacher, who followed it up with the School’s Management 
Committee and a shalish was called with the parents of  those involved. 
The outcome was one that ruled in the girl’s favour and undertaking that 
they would desist from the harassment, which at the time of  the field visit 
appeared to be successful. It was felt unlikely that such an outcome would 
have been secured so easily a decade ago.
It was reported, though we did not have data to support this, that both 
economic empowerment and NGO awareness raising had contributed 
to a recent increase in the incidence of  divorces initiated by women. 
As female education levels have also increased, we were told that some women 
divorced because they would no longer put up with mistreatment and a lack 
of  mutual understanding. They were now more likely to raise their voice 
when previously they lacked both the confidence to do so and the necessary 
knowledge of  the law and of  local services. On the issue of  child marriage, 
People dealing with the power structure need to negotiate with patrons 
if  they are seeking to solve a problem or advance their interests. There is still 
flexibility and negotiation in the types of  patronage arrangements that are 
in place. As we have seen, factional politics can still also help to structure 
how local governance processes play out, for example in relation to a recent 
struggle for control over the Bazar Committee (see Box 4).
As we had found in the peri-urban area, most of  the radical development 
NGO activity we had encountered in 2004 has disappeared. Dispute 
settlement increasingly takes place in informal shalish settings rather than 
through the formal Village Court system, which is less frequently used. 
Local landless households who had been earlier assisted to secure title to 
khas land by NGO action seem to have been able to hold on to it.31 However, 
other such available land that has emerged in the period since has been 
illegally occupied by local elites as had often happened during the 1990s. 
As Box 6 highlights, the absence of  this type of  formal civil society does 
not mean that concerned citizens cannot sometimes organise to take action 
to protect their, or other people’s, interests. We found some small-scale 
examples of  informal civil society resistance to the expansion of  local power 
by the ruling party occasionally taking place. Here for example a Press Club 
journalist group challenged instances where the MP and his henchmen 
have attempted to encroach on land that does not belong to them. This 
can be seen as taking the form of  what Hossain (2011, p.918) terms ‘rude 
accountability’, suggesting that it is important to pay more attention to 
unruly types of  informal behaviour (aggressiveness, impoliteness, shaming) 
as strategies used poor people for demanding better public services. The 
threat of  ‘fear of  exposure in the media’ is another form of  pressure of  this 
kind.
Box 6: Informal civil society: media action against land grabbing
Near one bazar we were shown an area of public land that people have used 
for decades as a football field. In 2013 people noticed that about 40 new 
small brick and tin roof shops began appearing on part of the field. This was 
seen as an encroachment on what was regarded as community common. 
During construction of these shops the local national Liberation War memorial 
monument was also damaged. It turned out that the new shops were being 
31  Khas land is fertile unowned land that can emerge when rivers change course that the law 
requires to be distributed to landless households, but usually occupied instead by elites 
employing the use of  force.
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their statement so that it only named four persons (making it a less serious 
crime of  ‘snatching’ rather than robbery, with lower penalties).
Finally, non-poor men talked about aspects of  the formal and informal 
aspects of  the power structure and the ways both elements sometimes 
reinforced each other. For example, it was felt that the MP’s control of  
both the local Police Administration and the local College Management 
Committee are important strategies to extend his power. 
Box 5: Migration, gender concerns, and clan politics
We met a forty five year old female resident of the well-connected village whose 
husband has worked in Saudi Arabia for the last ten years. While he only 
manages to come back to the village every two or three years, he has been 
able to send money back regularly to the family. They have one son and two 
daughters. The son is the eldest child, married three years ago and now lives 
separately adjacent to his father’s house. Since this was effectively a female-
headed household, and they felt insecure, they decided that eldest daughter 
should be married off at a very young age - when she was in class nine and only 
13 years old. This went ahead even though it was an illegal child marriage under 
the country’s law. She now lives at a home with her mother in law and youngest 
daughter. However, she had become involved in an extra-marital relationship 
with a young man, nephew of the UPZ chairman and an AL student activist. 
Her mother in law filed a complaint to the leaders of the Bazar Committee 
and a shalish was held, attended by members of the Bazar Committee and 
other UP members. However, in their deliberations they were mainly critical of 
the daughter, not the young man. He was warned not to visit the daughter’s 
house again but many villagers apparently considered the verdict too lenient 
simply because he was the UPZ chairman’s nephew. Clan politics continues to 
play a role in the local power structure, and contributes to the perpetuation of 
patriarchal norms.
NGO credit facilities are now providing people with easy access to loans, 
which are larger than they were in 2004, and these days NGOs support 
small business development rather than poverty reduction as their priority. 
There were no complaints over NGO loan repayment disputes being 
brought to the UP authorities (that had been a frequent complaint from 
local officials last time). It was also reported that there was less need today 
for poor people to resort to exploitative informal moneylenders than had 
been the case previously.
The use of  informal arrangements to ‘coordinate’ local efforts through 
party supporters also helps to enhance the power of  the ruling party. 
While there is an ostensible commitment at the level of  central government 
and donors to the strengthening of  decentralisation structures and 
processes, on the ground a new set of  informal strategies emerging. 
These create local arrangements for the extension of  ruling party power 
at the local level.
Women are slowly moving into positions of  power within formal 
decision-making positions in structures such as the UP and the UPZ 
within local decentralisation efforts. However, despite efforts to promote 
gender inclusion, we heard one woman UPZ member in our area report 
her experience that their scope for exercising power and decision making 
remains highly constrained by patriarchal culture (Box 7).
Box 7: Marginalisation of a woman UPZ member
We met a local UP women member, who had subsequently been elected to 
sit on the UPZ Parishad as a women member, and is also President of the 
Women’s Awami League in her local Union. She said that knows the rules 
but still found it hard to be taken seriously as a women representative: ‘In the 
Gazette many duties and responsibilities for women members are listed. But 
UP Chair entrusts me with few of these responsibilities. Allocation of VGF cards 
comes up twice a year, and VGD once every two years. When distributing the 
cards, the UP Chair says there are aren’t any for me. But in the Gazette it says 
that women are entitled to one out of every three’. However, being politically 
aware, she also pays close attention to the allocation process and tries to check 
the cards allocated for male members. She sometimes manages to increase 
her control over a small number of these allocations. When it comes to the 40 
Days employment generation project (the public works scheme launched by the 
Bangladesh government in 2009), she explained that there are six committees 
organising payments to over 300 local people, but with no women involved in 
any of them. She has complained to the authorities about this without success. 
She resents the idea that a proportion of available ‘safety net’ resources is 
expected to go back to AL leaders, even though she is herself a party person. 
She insists that these resources should go to ordinary people. She is also 
concerned that there is no transparency around the use of the UP taxes, drawn 
from market and from land sales (a tax of 1% on each). No one knows where 
this goes - and it may be as high as Tk1 crore, she believes. But she is generally 
supportive of the UP Chair and says he comes to her village participate in a 
shalish if she asks him to. When it comes to her role in the UPZ, she says she is 
able to achieve very little. She was once called for the Coordinating Committee, 
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built with the support of the President of the Bazar Committee (who was 
also the General Secretary of the AL’s local chapter), backed by the local MP. 
People told us this particular MP has a reputation for unruliness and is linked 
to a faction engaged in criminality of this kind. When he heard about this, the 
UP Chair contacted the General Secretary of the local Press Club who visited 
with five other journalists. Deciding to write an article in the press to draw 
attention to the injustice, they were immediately offered bribes by members of 
the faction not to do so (amounting to about Tk50 thousand). They refused the 
money and filed their news stories, which appeared in several national daily 
newspapers with the headline ‘Politically influential persons collaborate with 
local administration to destroy the Shaheed Minar and grab football field land’. 
It was alleged that each faction member had gained Tk1-2 lakhs from each 
prospective shop renter before starting the land grab, and had also passed 
kickbacks on to the MP and various other local officials. We heard from the 
General Secretary that they had allegedly got the go-ahead to do this by the 
MP: ‘The UPZ Chairman was also aware about the conspiracy, but he did not 
raise his voice about it. We learned about all this from the UP Chairman, his 
cousin.’ Following the press reports, the independent Ekushi TV station sent 
a team to cover the story. The result was more pressure on the authorities to 
remove the construction - but the MP stopped the UNO from doing so. The TV 
people then responded with more stories, including highlighting other cases 
of illegal activity involving the MP. This drew the attention of a local activist 
NGO based in Rajbari. When the PM was due to visit the area, a human chain 
protest was organised in April 2014. Two days after the visit the illegal buildings 
were demolished. The MP’s faction had been successfully pressured by a 
combination of local unruly action, help from an NGO and a key role played 
by local activist media. Even though the AL dominates civil society, space can 
sometimes be opened up within its factions in support of small forms of pro-
poor change.
The current UPZ Chair (formerly a popular local UP Chair) continues 
to wield great influence here since he is now with the ruling party, having 
switched from his former Jatiya Party allegiance. The fluidity of  these party 
allegiances is also illustrated by the fact that the BNP-affiliated local UP 
Chair is his nephew, which helps to create a smooth relationship. Kinship 
continues to structure local power relations within local families, but in this 
case also leads to factional tensions with the MP (see Box 5). During the 
recent UP elections it was reported that the UPZ Chair had even undertaken 
some campaigning in favour of  his nephew.
Only around a half  (100 families) remain in our study area compared 
with last time. Many of  those affected have relocated to places nearby. 
Meanwhile a new char land area has emerged on the other side of  the 
Padma River from the village, creating more than two hundred acres 
of  new land. About 60-70 households from our study area have already 
started cultivating crops on this new land. Rice prices remain stagnant, 
but some of  these farming households are now growing more high value 
cash crops like vegetables on this fertile char land.
As in the previous two locations the ruling AL party has succeeded in 
building closer links with local institutions through putting in place both 
formal and informal strategies. For example at the formal level local, Ward 
sabha (where there is supposed to be local input into decisions about public 
works projects) are mainly now overseen by the MP, who ensures top down 
control over local planning. However, we also learned from focus group 
discussions that most villagers broadly accept this changed state of  affairs: 
since no one usually objects if  useful local infrastructure improvements are 
the result. The presence of  the MP also ensures that more resources are 
likely to be made available. 
Women’s position, and their livelihoods more generally, have improved 
less here than in the other two villages. Women face discrimination in 
labour markets and we learned for example that women’s wages were 
much lower than those of  men in this area, for example women working 
in the field receive Tk200 per day compared to men who normally receive 
Tk350-400. There are also lower levels of  education, and poorer access 
to services. Perhaps because of  this there are now NGOs working here 
to support women’s livelihoods activities with small-scale business loans. 
This is different from 2004, when we found welfare and relief  NGO 
work only. Despite the stronger NGO presence than before, there are 
still no NGOs doing rights-based development or social mobilisation 
NGOs working here. Access to justice is a problem for poor families. 
While doing the fieldwork we learned of  a recent case of  violence against a 
local poor woman by a member of  a local elite family that was only partially 
resolved. The woman’s family went to the local police to file a case against the 
attacker, but allies of  the perpetrator were able to successfully able to persuade 
the police not to take the case and instead for the matter to be dealt with 
through a shalish, which simply required that an apology be made and no other 
action taken. The woman’s family were obviously highly dissatisfied with this 
level of  justice, and her sister said ‘We had wanted to file a formal case of  sexual 
harassment but due to the pressure of  the local elites it had to be resolved by the shalish’.
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but then found they had not made room for her. She has complained to the 
UNO and MP to no effect. She says the woman Vice-Chair role is marginalised 
within most of the UPZ’s activities and decision-making.
 
This area contains many Hindu families. Focus group discussions 
indicated a relatively high level of  communal harmony and a lower level 
of  tension than some national media reports might suggest in the country 
as a whole. The role of  the UP chair in maintaining harmony and offering 
fair treatment in disputes between Muslim and Hindu households was 
recounted in a case discussed in the non-poor women focus group. 
One individual from the Hindu community had sold his homestead land to 
a Muslim neighbour with a condition that if  in future the neighbour wants 
to sell the land he would sell it back to him, an agreement that was witnessed 
by the UP Chair. Later the buyer sold the land to another Muslim neighbour 
and the original owner lodged a complaint to the UPZ Chair and to the 
UP Members, who initiated a shalish to resolve the matter. As a result of  its 
decision, he was ordered to return the land and he did so.
3.3 The remote village
We had found this environmental unstable location (the village is located 
in a char area) to be by far the most deprived area in the previous study. 
In 2004 it had recently faced devastating floods and every household had 
received relief  goods from the UP, from humanitarian NGOs and from 
political parties. In this area, local power was most strongly politicised as 
well, perhaps because of  its history as an area where Maoist groups had 
operated during the 1980s. Today there are still poor communications and 
weak infrastructure. The village is not far in geographical distance from 
Rajbari town, but it has been cut off by changes to the river system and 
there are no bridges that could give easy access to the surrounding area 
and the town. The gains from Bangladesh’s wider economic growth 
are harder to detect here than in the other two locations. Local houses 
are mainly of  the traditional build with tin roofs, and there are even a 
few thatched houses that remain. 
This village continues to be a vulnerable place to live due to the severe 
environmental pressures caused by river erosion. Many local households 
are losing both homestead and farm land. It would be logical to assume 
that climate change is also contributing to these growing environmental 
pressures. For example, we learned that major river erosion events have 
led to around 40% of  the original village land being lost since 2004. 
locally-made clothing in line with more urban styles. Many households have 
sent one son as an apprentice. It was explained to us that in doing so they were 
making a trade off between dropping out of school early (which was regretted) 
and accessing what is considered a very good new economic opportunity (even 
if child labour is involved). It is considered that sending boys is more respectable 
than sending girls for this type of work. In one example, villagers told us of a 
particular boy who had first migrated to Keraniganj several years ago and had 
become very successful, owning five tailoring shops today. Initially these boys 
serve an informal training apprenticeship with a tailor where they learn the skills 
over a two-year period in return for food and lodging. They eventually graduate 
to working the machines and start to send money home. Some boys have been 
able to expand further and set up their own small tailoring shops and employing 
others in this expanding sector. We heard of one villager, who has recently 
established a factory and employs 29 people. He initially asked for Tk300 
thousand from his father (who took out a land bond to raise the loan) to set up 
the factory and within a few years was earning a substantial annual return on his 
investment many times that amount and he now considers himself very well off.
There was widespread disappointment voiced among both of  the female 
focus groups with regards the local UP women member, Mrs S. It was said 
that she had only visited them once or twice during the election and that 
they had heard nothing from her since. One person mentioned that her son 
had come to distribute VGD welfare cards to people on her behalf. As in the 
other locations, it was said that the AL MP and his party activists distributed 
VGD cards to supporters in order to by-pass the local BNP UP chair. But 
it was not possible to establish for what proportion of  the cards this was the 
case. An informal shalish held in the nearby town is increasingly preferred 
as a more practical option by village authorities than the formal Village 
Court that would be required to be held at the UP which is located further 
away. It was agreed that Mrs S. does not usually play any role in the shalish 
proceedings.  
They also talked about changing levels of  respect in the community, and 
the fact that youths do not pay as much attention to the advice of  their elders, 
and that decisions from the traditional shalish system are often not observed 
properly. The example is given of  an abandoned woman with a child who 
tried to get justice and have the community insist that the husband took her 
back. He simply disregarded the decision, disappeared and was reportedly 
living in Pabna where he remarried. He has not divorced his first wife either, 
and does not visit for fear of  attack by his wife’s brothers. She now manages 
by working as a domestic servant nearby. 
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As in the other areas, there are nevertheless interesting examples to be 
found of  informal local level civil society mobilisations or acts of  resistance. 
When people belonging to a neighbouring ruling party faction supported by 
the MP tried to stock with fish a local flooded area to which villagers had 
traditionally had the rights, a collective action was undertaken by locals one 
night and the outsiders were made to withdraw. 
Some of  this might also be partly due to the unusual political history 
of  this area, which has a tradition of  left-wing militancy (see Box 9). 
During the 1980s and 1990s underground Maoist groups built local links 
in certain remote char areas like this one, based on a combination involving 
the community in problem-solving, empowerment and education, and 
sometimes intimidation. We learned that this history had led to relatively 
good law and order and respect for women’s rights that is perhaps higher 
than other villages. 
Issues and findings
Out-migration to livelihoods opportunities in Dhaka have been central to 
this community’s efforts to maintain livelihoods in the face of  deteriorating 
natural resource capital and continuing isolation. As with many other 
villages, some young women have gone to Dhaka for domestic and garment 
work. However, and distinctive to this location, we were surprised to discover 
extensive out-migration among young boys for tailoring opportunities in 
Keraniganj, Dhaka (Box 8). Here the boys work as informal apprentices 
so that they can gain tailoring skills to enable them to set up small business 
in the country’s expanding domestic clothing industry. Parents value the 
economic opportunities that they believe this will provide in the future, even 
though this means their sons are withdrawing from getting an education. 
We learned that some village boys have already gone on to build their own 
profitable tailoring business and small factories in Dhaka bringing in high 
incomes. Other households say they are keen to emulate these examples. 
Box 8: ‘Informal vocational training’: migrating for tailoring work in Keraniganj
The remote village has been hard-hit by high levels of riverbank erosion, centring 
on a major erosion event in 2007, leading to loss of village land and increased 
pressure on livelihoods. Households reported that they send increasing 
numbers of school age boys (as young as 10-12) to small-scale tailoring 
businesses near Dhaka. This informal small-scale work is quite distinct from the 
export garments factories that mainly employ women. It caters to increasing 
demand from local households - who are becoming more prosperous - for 
woman’s family had been unable to get justice or even to convene a shalish 
since the family was poor, and the incident went without consequences. 
The local BNP-affiliated Chair oversees UP activities in general but 
we understood from focus groups that he is becoming more marginalised. 
For example, he does not appear to play much of  a role in the informal 
shalish, which is increasingly the preserve of  ruling party people only. 
Surprisingly, one local former Maoist activist, Mr J. who had gained the 
respect of  many people who live in the village, was elected in 2011 as a UP 
member for the ruling AL party (Box 9). He grew on good terms with the 
local MP and became active in assisting the AL extend its power further 
into the village, enabling the MP to effectively bypass the UP Chair. This 
strategy has smoothed a path for the AL to incorporate the village more 
fully into its patronage network, despite the strength of  local support for 
this BNP-affiliated leader. By making a popular local political leader into 
a local client of  the AL he becomes a valuable resource, offering a better 
way to secure influence than trying to impose power from outside. Mr J’s 
story also illustrates the way the ruling party has managed to construct 
political alliances not just with local power holders in general but with leftist 
local political activists in particular, in an effort to incorporate them into its 
consolidation project.32
We understood that Mr J. had become powerful, even though he only 
the office of  UP member, as a well-connected AL leader close to the MP. He 
distributes relief  goods, solar panels and road maintenance job opportunities 
in the community. Mr J. is also is gatekeeper for various targeted assistance 
programmes that end up being implemented informally by party activists 
rather than elected officials. One woman also reports that it is only due to 
his kindness that she was able to access the 40 Days earthworks programme, 
when her husband was unable to work due to infirmity. However, she also 
reported having to make an informal payment of  Tk1000 to the programme 
office at the UP and Tk500 to a UP member in order to make this happen. 
We found several NGOs operating in the area, including ASA and 
BRAC. These provide loans for productive activities, but usually only give 
them to those who already have some land. One group member recounted 
how her husband who is a fisherman was able to build a new boat with a loan 
32  However, we later learned that Mr J. had not been re-elected in the 2016 UP election, 
suggesting perhaps that the informal arrangement was no longer needed now that the AL 
had increased its local representation.
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We learned from the female focus groups that there are different views 
about household decision-making. Some women told us that these days 
decision-making is a joint process between husband and wife, and that if  
they are unable to reach a decision they consult their older children too. But 
others felt that husbands often did not consult their wives or that if  they do, 
they only act on the wife’s opinions very occasionally and mostly disregard 
them. Indeed one man told us that ‘it is not wise to share all of  your problems with 
an illiterate wife’.
We were also told about the persistence of  child marriage in this 
community, driven in part by concerns about women’s security and honour. 
By the age of  15 or 16 most people agree they should be married and there 
is a fear that particularly with the rise of  mobile phones, that rumours about 
illicit relationships can start more easily and earlier with daughters, making 
it more difficult to get marriage proposals. No one wants to be the subject 
of  rumours. One woman explains that she has married off her underage 
daughter because she was worried about risk to her reputation. She said ‘I 
could not go anywhere leaving my adult daughter at home. So I made stronger tin walls for 
my house by taking out a loan.’ She recently married off her daughter out of  fear 
losing honour and dignity, giving a dowry of  Tk45 thousand and a Tk15 
thousand gold chain at the demand of  the bridegroom.   
People were generally positive about the improving law and order 
situation in recent years, and it was observed that many people believed 
that the activities of  the underground leftist party had historically created 
a community in which there was relatively less violence against women 
and fewer land disputes than in many other areas. However, a growing 
problem with youths and drugs is mentioned as a source of  concern. 
While we were told there was little or no political violence in the area, we 
were given reports of  small-scale theft and mugging. Some of  this is related 
to gang violence between local youths of  different areas. This lawlessness 
has occasionally led to cases of  serious violence. For example, we learned 
of  a recent case where one youth who had been involved in mugging over 
a long period was attacked and killed by victims who had been unable to 
secure redress, after it had been rumoured that he and his family had the 
protection of  the local police due to a ruling party affiliation. 
We heard that there was regular harassment of  women in an area near 
the Padma riverbank. Gender violence often goes unpunished, particularly 
if  it is perpetrated by wealthy against the poor. For example, we heard of  a 
case where a boy had molested a sleeping woman through a window but the 
conditioned the villagers to have less crime and more respect for women’s 
rights than other villages. Over time, the PBSP’s influence waned and leaders 
such as Mr J. started to build tactical alliances with the AL, helping to get the 
MP elected by delivering local votes. However, he was arrested with some other 
activists in 2010 after an eruption of political violence and jailed. While in jail he 
was elected to the UP in 2011, and with the MP’s patronage he was released 
from jail. As part of the deal, the MP also got him taken off the Rapid Action 
Battalion’s (RAB) ‘crossfire’ political assassination list that would most likely 
have cost him his life in 2013, as it had his colleagues who were killed after they 
came out of jail. Mr J. now serves as a popular local leader with a direct line 
to the MP. He explained to us how his direct informal link with the MP allows 
there to be a 50/50 with safety net funds and entitlements that are supposed 
to go through the UP, with half going instead for distribution amongst local AL 
supporters. He was also recently given 40 tons of FFW rice directly from the MP 
for local distribution. He told us that he worked with the MP to manage local 
development work as well: ‘We are implementing most of the road construction 
projects in the area, and the UP is not involved with this work at all’. (Note: this 
data was collected before Mr J.’s failure to secure re-election later in 2016).
The non-poor women are extremely concerned about the problem of  
river erosion and the loss of  family land. Some families who lost land where 
they lived in the village have moved to the nearby char area. They had 
compensated by the UP with Tk5000 after a member made effort on their 
behalf  following the major erosion event of  2007. But another person in a 
similar situation reported only being given Tk3000 and she suspected the 
reason was political, since she did not have the same connections. The male 
non-poor focus group discussions confirm the fact that there was a distinction 
made in the distribution of  relief  goods between those sympathetic to the 
ruling party and those discriminated against and given a reduced entitlement. 
They also say that around ten local girls have gone to work in Dhaka garment 
factories, in addition to the 400 or so boys from the area believed to be working 
in in the domestic garment production centre near Dhaka. They explain that 
there are more NGO operating in this area than 10 years ago, listing seven 
different organizations all of  which are giving loans.
The non-poor men also described the way the MP oversees a higher 
degree of  the distribution of  development and relief  supplies in the village. 
They say that people receive around 70% of  the distributed VGD cards 
through the UP and around 30% are provided through AL local leaders 
and activists. The UPZ chair informs all the UP chairmen of  the MP’s 
instructions. This is also the case with Test Relief  and Food for Work 
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from an NGO and this had successfully increased the household’s income. 
One woman reported she had been able to purchase the new household 
asset of  a cow, another a loan to enable the family to buy nine decimals of  
land. However, unlike in the other two locations, there were a few complaints 
voiced in the poor and non-poor women’s groups about the pressures of  
loan repayments.
Given the vulnerability of  the area to regular floods, provision of  relief  
goods from the MP, and from NGOs working in the area, remain important 
to local livelihoods and the maintenance of  local patron-client relationships. 
During one period of  severe flooding a few years ago we heard from the 
poor focus group members that the MP had distributed Tk5000 cash and 
a substantial relief  package that had included tin housing materials to each 
household. The MP’s younger brother, the president of  UPZ Chambers 
of  Commerce and Industries, had also distributed blankets and tubewell 
equipment during this time. 
The male poor focus group members confirm the earlier views about 
the power of  the MP in that he controls the UPZ and UP, the police, and 
access to common property resources, and he oversees the distribution of  
the resources that flow into the village and surrounding area. One member 
complains at the way the BNP is losing power in the area despite the efforts 
of  the UP chair: ‘Police are now arresting BNP leaders without any cause and it’s 
become their main business because now political cronyism and narrow political self-
interest is everywhere. Our UP chairman is a BNP leader, but now he cannot undertake any 
local development activities’. Another person is unhappy that road construction 
and repair often takes place without much local involvement from the UP, 
such as a nearby one kilometre stretch of  road that was recently completed 
by the Zila parishad grants, managed by the MP and implemented by ruling 
party member Mr J. (Box 9).
Box 9: UP Member Mr J.: Informality, patronage and flexible allegiances
In the remote village, relations between the MP and the UP are not operating 
according to the formal rules. With a BNP UP Chair in post, the MP has 
instead decided to build a special relationship with one particular UP member 
named Mr J., who is aligned with the AL. A local activist, he was for many 
years underground political leader for the underground Maoist Purbo Bangla 
Sharbohara Party (PBSP) (formed in the 1960s) that has long had influence in 
this char area. In its heyday, the group had controlled the village - settling land 
disputes, extorting resources from government, and engaging in acts of political 
violence often in support of poor households. It is said that this type of politics 
However, not all households are equal in terms of  their security of  
tenure. Some households face an additional level of  vulnerability due to the 
pattern of  ownership. There are two main forms of  residence status. Around 
one third are owners of  property in the slum (having built their houses here 
when the land was first occupied) and most of  these residents now own 
more than one room. The rest are tenants who are paying rent to these 
landowners. Of  the slum households, around 30% today are ‘landlords’ and 
70% are tenants. Tenants pay in the region of  Tk2000-2500 per month for a 
single room house. Landlords each rent out on average around seven rooms 
to their tenant households. Some landlords still live in the slum, while a few 
now live outside.
Over the years the slum has evolved into a small relatively self-contained 
neighbourhood, with its own facilities. There are three bazars, a primary 
school, a secondary school, five mosques (plus two mosques with madrasas) 
and an NGO-run day care centre. Most local services are provided through 
a combination of  legal and illegal private providers. Gas and electricity 
services are mostly obtained through illegal vendors. Services are generally 
inadequate for the high density of  residents, with for example only one legal 
water connection per 15 or so households.
The local power structure here is completely different to the other 
study areas. Since this is an informal settlement, there are no formal 
local government institutions in place directly serving or representing 
the community. UPs do not exist in urban areas. Instead there is a City 
Corporation divided into 36 Wards, each of  which is headed by an elected 
Ward Commissioner (WC). The City Corporation was divided into 
two halves in 2011, North and South, each with its own elected Mayor. 
The location of  this slum places it formally under the jurisdiction of  CC, 
which is nominally responsible for governing the slum. The community 
attracts attention from local politicians because it constitutes an important 
‘vote bank’. Informal governance arrangements has traditionally been 
organised in the slum around an urban variant of  the village-style shalish 
system, with matbars attempting to recreate their roles as elders. People 
reported that they had grown frustrated with this ad hoc system and that 
its decisions had become compromised by undue influence from the local 
police, and by competing factions/gangs. 
Although there are no formal local government structures in the slum, 
in other ways, the picture is not so different from the villages we studied 
in Greater Faridpur. There are extensive patron-client relationships, NGOs 
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programmes. The local AL leaders draw up the TR and Food for Work 
project documents and submit them to the MP who then sends approval to 
local UP staff. In the case of  FFW programmes, the Project Implementation 
Officer (PIO) at each UPZ assesses the allocations according to the MP’s 
recommendations. AL leaders collect TR forms from the UPZ from the PIC 
then take recommendation from MP and submit it to UPZ Chair. 
3.4 The urban study area
The settlement we chose for inclusion in the study is located in North Dhaka, 
situated on around 40 acres of  government land, adjacent to a public 
hospital that is formally owned by the Ministry of  Health. Squatters have 
continuously occupied the site for more than 35 years. The initial residents 
of  the slum were low paid employees of  what was then a brand new hospital, 
such as drivers and guards. There was no local community housing available, 
and so they squatted on the hospital-owned land nearby. The numbers are 
currently believed to have grown to be around 6,355 households on the site 
today, with a total population of  more than 25,000 people. There is also a 
Hindu community in the slum, numbering around a thousand households. 
As in the case of  the Greater Faridpur study areas, we heard no reports of  
tensions between religious or other minority communities.
Most households who live here have livelihoods that combine both 
informal and formal sector employment. Work includes rickshaw 
pulling, small-scale trading, domestic servants, garment factories, 
and administrative employment in public or private sector offices. 
Everyone is more or less employed, even though in the garment sector 
there have recently been some closures. The residents have not been 
able to acquire formal land rights. 
A key form of  vulnerability faced by many residents is the threat of  
eviction. Whenever government development plans for the area arise, 
as happens every so often, people begin to organise and resist, using 
a combination of  local informal civil society action and patronage. 
Successful coalitions have usually been formed by combining community-
based action with appeals for support from powerful outside figures. 
One example was when a high profile lawyer in 1997 filed a writ in High 
Court to successfully protect the slum. In February 2014 the CC mayor 
visited at the invitation of  the WC, and announced that the slum was now 
to be formally named an ‘ideal town’. This change is believed by many 
residents to have raised the status and profile of  the community.
phoned the UO authorities and they found and arrested the son, investigated 
the dispute and ended up fining the son. On the whole we found people were 
positive about the services and prepared to pay the charges. They told us they 
were less undesirable than the informal payments they used to have to make to 
the police where they got little in return. The ruling party is increasing its control 
over both urban and rural areas using informal structures. While there are clearly 
some benefits, the effect is one of reducing civil society space for independent 
action. NGOs must get permission from the UO to operate. This negotiation 
works both ways, since when NGOs bring in outside resources and improve 
conditions, this also reflects well on the UO.
The main problems faced by people face in the slum reported in 
focus group discussions were the high cost of  living, relatively poor access 
to services, and insecure tenure. Concerns about the rising cost of  living 
contrasted with what we had heard in the rural areas, where people were 
less concerned with economic problems. Rents are increasingly high, and 
people say that they cannot easily challenge these increases. When it comes 
to services, drainage, sanitation and electricity are all problematic. Women 
reported that they face particular disadvantages in accessing and receiving 
good quality health services compared to men. Key problems remain 
around low levels of  pregnancy care, advice about child rearing, issues of  
early marriage, and around violence against women. 
There are only very limited efforts by the CC to address these problems. 
In the focus groups we learned that there have been some improvements 
in the provision of  services (including from the new political arrangements 
described in Box 10) but that rising living costs mean that some people 
say they cannot now afford to stay here and are moving elsewhere. 
Box 11 provides a glimpse into the economic hardship of  slum life for a 
female-headed household. Instead, it remains mainly down to outside 
organisations such as NGOs and informal sector private traders to provide 
essential services to people in this community. These private service vendors 
are also linked to the wider power structure, so that people also have to pay 
informal fees to the police and to the electricity and gas utility offices to keep 
their access to services. 
As in Faridpur, formal development NGOs are found to be providing 
economic support in the forms of  business training and microcredit. 
These NGOs are generally well regarded. While people told us they know 
that working for an NGO is a ‘profession’, with staff earning good salaries 
for their work, they felt that on the whole they do get useful benefits from the 
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that provide different types of  services, and there are local households 
differentiated by different economic status. As we found in Greater Faridpur, 
the ruling AL party has recently become active in seeking and finding ways 
to extend its power more fully into the community. 
Issues and findings
A key change in governance terms occurred in 2015 when the ruling party-
controlled DNCC established an unofficial Unit Office (UO) in the centre 
of  the slum. The UO is not a formal component of  the local government 
system: it is essentially an ad hoc unofficial governance structure created by 
the ruling party as a means of  extending its control, comparable to some of  
the arrangements we observed in the village areas. This provides an indirect 
mechanism for the City Corporation to address challenges faced by people 
in the slum.
A local party official, Mr A., oversees an elected Unit Committee (UC) 
that makes decisions on local projects and issues, and deals with community 
problems. A lawyer is also on hand to give advice on legal issues and disputes. 
The UO is housed in a disused temporary Ansar paramilitary security force 
office.33 This building had been abandoned after its occupants were ejected 
by residents unhappy with the force’s rent-seeking behaviour. The UO now 
controls the area as a de facto local government office (Box 10). 
Box 10: Informal slum governance via the Ward Commissioner’s ‘Unit Office’
The UO is a relatively new informal governance structure established by the 
ruling party in 2015 as an outpost of the local ward. The creation of the UO 
establishes a mechanism that helps the AL to consolidate its power and 
connect with an important vote bank. The UO is resourced from the Ward, 
but also raises money through unofficial taxation. We do now know whether 
such structures are typical of other slums. Its emergence is perhaps due to 
this slum’s large size, similar to a rural Union. We learned that around Tk20 
per day is collected from each shop owner, and that the NGOs working in the 
slum also pay informal fees to operate. The UO also provides various services 
to residents that are charged for, such as dispute settlement and unofficial 
policing. There is a lawyer at the UO to advise and assist people. One example 
that was recounted to us was the recent case of a father who abducted his 
son after a family dispute and prevented him fleeing to Mymensingh. The family 
33  The Ansar force was originally set up by the Pakistani authorities in 1947 and later 
revitalized by President Ziaur Rahman in the late 1970s.  
landowners are building good houses, and adding second stories, and they 
also feel security has improved. It is not possible to evict them in spite of  not 
having formal title to the land. Instead, they have improved their security 
through new patronage relationships built with the ruling party.
Box 11: A female-headed garment worker household
Our informant works as a machine operator at a large factory around a mile 
away where several thousand women are employed. She has two children 
but is without a husband, thought she did not wish to talk about what had 
happened to him. She pays Tk2000 rent for a room. Unusually, she is a 
member of a DSK-organised CBO groups even though she is a tenant. She told 
us that some local garment factories have closed recently due to tighter factory 
inspections following the 2013 Rana Plaza collapse and that work is becoming 
harder to obtain. This meant that some women in the slum had lost their jobs, 
and were now looking for employment further afield in Gazipur where there are 
many garment factories offering better working conditions. All of them though 
have been able to find jobs and have not faced unemployment. Others have 
started to work as domestic servants. We were told that garment salaries had 
increased from Tk4300 starting salary to Tk6700 per month. The tiffin allowance 
has also increased from Tk9 to Tk12, with more overtime, paid holidays, primary 
healthcare, and day-care facilities for children. These facilities are free and at 
her factory there are a dozen or so slum children using them, with free food 
also provided. She tells us that overall conditions for workers have improved 
since Rana Plaza, such as three months paid maternity leave now being made 
available. There is no formal trade union allowed at the factory, but we were 
told that there is an informal system where the workers elect representatives to 
work with management to solve any issues that emerge. There are five of these 
worker leaders, three female and two male, and she says she is fairly happy 
with the system.
NGOs working in the slum are now also subject to the UO’s informal 
authority. For example, when DSK donated two rickshaw vans for the 
collection of  solid waste it was agreed that each household would pay a fee 
of  Tk20 per month for the service. The UO recently put this up to Tk50 and 
we learned that neither the NGO nor the residents felt able to do anything 
to challenge this. The composition of  the NGOs working in the slum has 
changed over the years. Those working during the 1990s like BRAC and 
Grameen and Proshika were mainly concerned with credit delivery and 
limited health services. Work on water and sanitation only began in 2006 
with DSK’s contract under the UNDP programme. This NGO work has 
only managed to cover 30% of  this slum with proper water and sanitation 
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NGOs. Many people take NGO loans and we learned that complaints are 
rare, since people say they generally earn enough to be able to pay them 
off. The president of  the UO reported that the number of  financial or loan 
disputes brought to the unit for adjudication is small and has declined in 
recent years, reflecting better conditions and local services. 
The most common problems presented at the UO are cases of  eviction, 
drug abuse, and domestic violence. It was felt that these problems were 
generally improving. Security is reported to have improved for most 
inhabitants. The male focus group reported that both the UO and the local 
police have become more responsive and proactive in dealing with local crime 
than before. A higher level of  lawlessness had previously existed in the slum 
when governance rested on a more unstable combination of  police, mastans 
and gangs. This has now been replaced by a more ordered top down system 
organised by the ruling party. Although it is difficult to establish precisely 
how people feel about this new arrangement, we found people were broadly 
positive about the fact that (a) law and order is improving, and (b) people are 
getting some actual services for their money. However, there were also a few 
reports of  the UO being involved in small-scale extortion. Mr A.’s leadership 
is based on his earlier well-respected record of  protecting slum dwellers 
from eviction, and his links with the WC who is generally popular. Mr A. 
has built a support base by leading processions to resist eviction, organising 
food distribution events, mobilising the media in support of  local causes, and 
negotiating with authorities to support people’s rights. He also helped his 
supporters secure improvements to their houses. If  residents have a dispute 
they still try to solve it themselves at CBO level, but if  this is not possible, 
they go to the UO.
The UO offers dispute resolution services, collects an informal tax (for 
example, each shop must now give Tk20 per day to the UO), sets prices 
for services, and has links with the local police station. The leaders and 
committee members are all AL activists. The emergence of  the UO seen as 
a positive development by many slum dwellers because it has improved law 
and order. People reported that the police are less able to harass them, or 
extort money from them as they once did. Both services and security have 
improved with the installation of  the UO. Reminiscent of  the old idea of  
the traditional village ‘net’, the UO has now thrown a new ‘net’ over the 
community in the sense that very little can now be done in the slum without 
its agreement. There are still reports of  rent extortion of  various types faced 
by residents who try to modernise or improve their houses, or of  payments 
enforced by buyers and sellers of  property in the slum area. The de facto 
The origin of  most CBOs lies with the UNDP’s Urban Partnerships for 
Poverty Reduction (UPPR) project that ended in 2015.34 The UPPR project 
has long been active in slums like this, working with the City Corporation 
to improve slum infrastructure, mainly water and sanitation, and provide 
credit services. The project has partnered with NGOs to help people set up 
CDCs (community development committees). These are community-based 
organizations provide vehicles for people to organise to improve provision 
and access to services and to access credit and savings, and these CBOs are 
linked into federations. There have been at least ten different NGOs active 
in providing services, including water and sanitation, credit, education, 
health care, and legal aid. Some NGOs are also working outside the UNDP 
project to create CBOs. 
Box 12: Mrs S.’s story – The UO, CBOs, landlords and tenants
CBO leaders tend to be landlords who own and rent slum property. Mrs S.  
is one such local community leader who rents out a total of nine rooms.  
She has been closely involved with the NGO DSK, collaborating with them 
to install latrines in each of her houses. However, her leadership was recently 
called into question when she was accused of embezzling some of the CBO’s 
funds. These had been contributed by local residents in order to match NGO 
funding for service improvements. This may have been true, or it may simply 
have been the result of a perception among some group members that the 
upgrading was moving too slowly and that Mrs S. had failed to deliver.  
Having lost credibility, she became the centre of a dispute. It was widely 
believed that she had appropriated the money and tenants approached the UO 
to make a complaint. The UO filed a legal case against her. Mrs S responded 
by claiming that she had been the victim of a sexual assault by some of 
those taking action against her in this matter, and this claim was investigated. 
However, she later withdrew the allegation under pressure. Whatever the 
truth of the dispute in this particular case, such tensions reflect the landlord/
tenant hierarchy, the factional competition for scarce outside resources among 
community level groups, and a lack of trust in relation to management of the 
matching funding that has to be generated locally. Factions emerge and clash, 
and another leader P. has now taken over the CDC that Mrs S. used to lead. 
Mrs S. is now fed up with the Unit Office and describes them as ‘criminals’, 
since she feels they should have defended her more effectively. 
34  UPPR has worked to enable low-income households to develop stronger capacities to 
improve urban livelihoods through better security, business skills training partnerships, 
and community-based organisation and education. Overall, over 800,000 households 
have joined more than 2500 specially created Community Development Committees 
(CDCs), which are mostly led by women.
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facilities. The rest of  the people remain dependent on private water, gas, 
and electricity vendors who are intermediary service providers.
Despite the weakness of  the opposition, there is growing political 
factionalism reported within the ruling party. With the Ward Commissioner 
position currently held by a ruling party ‘rebel’, there is a continuing 
struggle to control the slum between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ AL candidates. 
The WC is under threat from an opposing faction, and the UO leader is 
his representative. There is potential instability in the fact that the Ward 
Commissioner is a rebel AL candidate whose victory relied heavily on the 
slum residents’ vote (around 80% voted for him last year). The UO building 
was attacked recently (May 2016) and there was an attempt to set it on 
fire, though there were no injuries as no one was there at the time. It is 
believed that a rival AL faction may have carried out the attack, acting for 
the ‘official’ AL candidate who had lost control of  this vote bank in the May 
2015 election.
The ruling party has also made a closer connection with the NGOs than 
was evident in the other study locations. NGOs are seen by local politicians 
to play a useful intermediary role in the governance of  the slum and in the 
maintenance of  the community vote bank. The UO has built influence and 
control the NGOs, and we heard about cases of  collusion and collaboration 
between the AL and NGOs. For example, the head of  one local NGO is a 
former left party activist. Such people often have good relationships with the 
local AL, since the ruling party has built alliances with left leaders as part of  
its strategy to fragment the BNP and JI opposition parties. The NGO benefits 
from the relationship and helps it build a good working environment, but it 
also means that the NGO has also in some senses also become a ‘client’ of  
local political leaders. One indication of  this is the recent price increase from 
Tk20 to Tk50 for solid waste collection by NGO-run vans. The NGO had 
little choice but to raise the price and people now have little choice but to pay 
it, even though it is a relatively large increase. While we might have previously 
expected an independent NGO to contest this on behalf  of  their constituency, 
as a client of  the UO it is now unable to act.
A particularly interesting feature of  the slum that is different from the 
rural areas is that there are active CBOs in the settlement. The existence 
of  CBOs based on grassroots membership supported by NGOs as 
intermediary organisations is a distinctive feature of  the urban study site. 
Such CBOs were only rarely found to operate in our rural settings, and 
were more likely to be credit groups rather than then fully fledged CBOs. 
relatively active and women-led. In the absence of  formal local governance 
structures these groups managing provision of  NGO services have also 
established horizontal solidarities supported by these NGOs to challenge 
the threat of  slum eviction. However, these groups too are now becoming 
more accountable to the UO and less close to the NGOs, especially since the 
flow of  resources from these NGOs has lessened since the end of  the UNDP 
project. A pro-UO faction dominates and DSK and other NGOs support 
the UO and the Commissioner. 
CH 3 • COMMUNITY LEVEL PERSPECTIVES: MAIN FINDINGS FROM THE 2016 DATA 8584 CH 3 • COMMUNITY LEVEL PERSPECTIVES: MAIN FINDINGS FROM THE 2016 DATA
CBOs have been organised by NGOs working with the residents (see 
Box 12). We were surprised to find that the CBOs are usually formed and 
dominated by landowner households, as opposed to the tenant households. 
Very few of  the tenants are actually involved in the CBOs. This makes 
sense if  we understand that landlords have been most proactive in engaging 
with the NGOs. They have worked hard for the opportunities to improve 
their own houses, and increase the value of  those they rent out. While 
landlord households were initially residents, as they have improved their 
positions and many now live outside - while keeping rental properties in 
the slum. The CBOs are therefore essentially landlord organisations, 
while the tenants have no real organisations of  their own. The same local 
CBO leader might also be president of  more than one such CDC/CBO. 
The CBOs tend to be led by women from these landlord households. 
They have been incentivized to access resources that will help them to 
upgrade their properties. Tenant households are left in a weaker position 
since they are not directly involved in building grassroots organisations 
that can help them further their interests, or reduce their vulnerability. 
The landlord households, through their connections been able to ensure 
that modern latrines and clean piped water is first installed on their own 
properties.
The two tier hierarchy we encountered in the slum reflects the distinction 
made by Banks (2016) between two main forms of  patron-client links: those 
made by relatively better off people with strong external networks seeking to 
improve household livelihoods via further resource accumulation, and those 
made by vulnerable people who lack connections and are simply trying to 
survive:
Households make considerable efforts to establish and maintain 
the reciprocal networks and patron–client relationships they need 
to cope with ongoing livelihoods insecurity… These hierarchies 
illustrate the critical difference between those in the upper two 
tiers with accumulation networks and those at the bottom of  the 
hierarchy who receive limited or exploitative returns through their 
survival networks.
While the extension of  ruling party power through informal means here 
is comparable to what is taking place in our rural study sites, there are also 
some differences. Compared with the rural areas, local infrastructure is 
very poor. However, there is more ‘social capital’ in the slum in the sense 







This section is organised across twelve themes that follow broadly areas 
framed in the terms of  reference for the study (Annex 1). Table 3 below 
summarises a comparison of  the original findings and those of  the re-
study, organised by theme in the terms of  reference. It also identifies 
the wider implications of  these findings for future policy and practice. 
Findings from the new portion of  the study that was carried out in the 
Dhaka slum community have also been integrated. 
4.1 How the power structure is perceived
Most people continue to understand the local power structure as a highly 
personalised set of  formal and informal relationships with more powerful 
people, including but not restricted to, elected or administrative officials. It 
is widely perceived as difficult to deal with, and as changing in ways that are 
often unfavourable. Poor people in particular regard it as unjust such that 
‘we poor people are unable to challenge the rich, even when they are breaking the law’, that 
local party activists ‘get things done by shouting and threatening’, and that older 
forms of  local leader such as matbars ‘are not shown much respect any more’.
Dealing with the power structure requires the constant effort to build 
connections in order to access opportunities and resources: people ‘can only 
get and do things via their connections to more powerful patrons’ (Gardner, 
2012, p.41). The importance of  connection and connectivity remains 
central to people’s efforts to improve their livelihoods and wellbeing. These 
informal relationships are used to strengthen existing formal claims on 
resources - such as an entitlement to a social safety net benefit – as well as to 
secure access to new opportunities, such as a contact enabling a person to 
take a up a migration opportunity leading to a job. What is different today 
is the wider range of  available people, information and connections that 
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4.2 Main actors and relationships
The picture that we encountered in 2015-16 is in some respects similar to 
the one reported in 2004 (see Table 1), but it has changed in three important 
ways. First, the ruling party has consolidated its control over local institutions 
as the main political opposition BNP remains in disarray, having failed 
to contest the last national election. Second, the conditions of  political 
competition have shifted from the previous duopolistic partyarchal system 
(involving both AL and BNP) towards a monopolistic one dominated by a 
single party.35 Third, the MP’s local power has increased since in this new 
scenario MPs assume a stronger role as gatekeepers of  resources (continuing 
a trend we had also observed on a far smaller scale in 2004).
This gatekeeper role has been an important factor that has made the 
UP less central to local democratisation and development efforts. Despite 
the fact that its staff work hard to vary out its remit, and there have been 
enhancements to its local role (such as providing information services), the 
UP is less central than before as a decision-making and resource allocation 
body. This phenomenon is particularly visible in our original study area where 
many UP leaders and members – at least until recently – were affiliated to 
the BNP opposition, and where MPs have built strategies to bypass them and 
build direct relationships with supporters and communities. In our urban site, 
a comparable situation exists with the use of  an informal strategy to extend 
ruling party influence in the form of  the Unit Office.
Finally - with the exception of  the urban site - formal civil society in the 
study areas has generally become more business focused and less diverse. 
Control by MPs is not only being extended over local government structures 
but also over local private sector groups such as Business Associations and 
local civil society such as local committees. Instead of  the rights-based 
development NGOs engaged in land rights and social mobilization that we 
encountered in 2004 (such as Samata), we mainly find credit-based work to 
support small enterprise development and economic livelihood strategies. In 
the urban site there is evidence for the co-option of  local NGOs as well. The 
interplay that we had previously observed between unfolding processes of  
decentralization and civil society action to support pro-poor change - such 
as pro-poor coalition building between NGOs and local UP leaders - has 
35  This ‘partyarchy’ also extends into civil society groups, such as associations of  lawyers 
and doctors, where factions loyal to each political party have interacted in a zero-sum 
fashion, with the ruling party faction able to monopolise rents and privileges.
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can be made, the greater flexibility in the ways in which connections can be 
constructed and influenced, and the range of  resources that exist – financial 
and technological – that can be deployed in the struggle to build such 
connections (see 4.3 below). But what is also different today is the growing 
party political dimension, which extends more deeply than before into local 
level power structure in both rural and urban localities.
The institution of  patronage, in its many forms, remains central, with 
‘… [with a] complex web of  informal patronage relations from the top to 
the grassroots level of  the society’’ (Feruci and Parnini 2014). In the earlier 
study we found that patron-client relationships were still pervasive but were 
growing less rigid. This continues to be the case. Landlord patrons, who 
previously locked poor rural people into long-term exploitative relationships 
of  sharecropping, domestic labour and indebtedness, and who captured 
resources coming into the village, have less of  a grip. The phenomenon 
in which some loan-providing NGOs were acting as petty patrons in local 
communities and occasionally visible in the earlier study seems to have 
declined. New forms of  patronage, such as forms of  media support to small 
struggle local struggles over land, might be emerging. People’s access to 
information is improved by technology and infrastructure, and at least in 
theory, there are more patrons with whom to elaborate relationships. 
Our findings therefore continue to support the continuing evolution of  
what Mannan (2015: 30) terms a ‘multifocal power structure’, as distinct 
from the land-based ‘unifocal’ one that had existed earlier (BRAC, 1982; 
Jansen, 1987). In this new context ‘no single patron is able to dominate 
the rural power structure as in the case of  erstwhile land-centric patrons. 
The competition among patrons created a situation of  balance …’. 
In other words patrons continue to dominate local village level activities 
and people’s options, but these power holders are today are more diverse 
and connected to wider business, politics, and civil society elites, deriving 
their power to a lesser degree from landholding and agricultural wealth. 
Yet local and national elites retain clan solidarities and kinship links that 
maintain elite solidarities, as the links between MPs and local leaders in two 
of  our three rural settings highlight (see Table 2 above). Overall therefore, 
while people in general have better links to economic opportunities, their 
opportunities for civil engagement and political participation have not 
increased to the same degree.
As we have seen, in both our rural and urban study locations, 
patronage has become more politicised. The AL controls most of  the 
points through which central resources are allocated (through its MPs, 
local administrative structures, or by-pass arrangements) and the points at 
which local resources are collected (such as Bazar Committees and Business 
Associations). Previously these might have given poorer people a widening 
range of  opportunities for alternative sources of  patronage and power. 
Today people’s choices are more limited, and there are fewer patrons for 
weaker sections of  the community to play off against each other in the 
competition for connections and resources than in 2004. For example, the 
Rickshaw Association is more tightly affiliated to the AL, and the shalish is 
less balanced between AL/BNP interests. A growing economy and more 
open power structure seems to benefit all groups, but at different rates, 
and this is likely over time to contribute to further inequalities.
4.4 Union and Ward level relationships with local formal institutions
Moving to the changing role of  the UP, a worrying finding is its increasing 
marginalisation as an important tier of  decentralised local government. 
While the UPs have never been particularly strong, our earlier study had 
found encouraging signs of  a growing inclusiveness and centrality as 
traditional local power relations loosened. There was little presence of  either 
the UPZ or the Zila in the earlier data, and Union was at the centre of  local 
development efforts and interacted with civil society around social and other 
issues. The efforts of  the 2009 UP Act and subsequent local government 
capacity building efforts led us to expect a continuation of  this trend but this 
is not what we found. In contrast to our previous findings, this time we heard 
from one local party activist that ‘the UP’s glory is now in the past’. Through the 
UPZ and the Zila system there is now more control of  the UP through the 
MPs and local political leaders. 
We did not find evidence that the 2009 Act’s envisaged closer collaboration 
between UPs and NGOs in local development work embedded in the 2009 
Act has materialised to any significant degree. There is far less evidence 
today that UPs are able to develop synergies with formal civil society actors. 
However, there are some small amounts of  additional NGO resources reach 
UPs and some small-scale joint work takes place. All the UPs can do to 
adjust to these new ‘rules of  the game’ is to try to negotiate with local power 
holders as best they can.
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faded. The overall diversity of  civil society actors and activities has been 
reduced. 
If  this is to be challenged, then as WDR 2017 suggests, we will need to look 
beyond technical ‘capacity building’ of  local government, decentralization 
and civil society to engage with power relations.
4.3 Governing access to political and economic opportunities
There are more economic opportunities for all groups across all of  our study 
sites. People are more connected to markets than in 2004 and the high level 
of  economic growth is creating new opportunities. With economic growth, 
better transport infrastructure and improved communications poor people 
now seek to obtain opportunities that can help them advance their interests 
- through establishing small enterprises, migrating locally or internationally, 
and getting involved in political activity. For ordinary people, there are many 
more economic opportunities to choose from beyond agriculture and a wider 
range of  potential patrons to turn to in order to secure access, including local 
political leaders, NGOs, and business people. However, it was notable that in 
the Dhaka urban slum location people in the focus group discussions (unlike in 
Greater Faridpur) raised concerns about the rising cost of  living, particularly 
in relation to increased rents.
Where women’s empowerment is occurring, our findings suggest that 
this is now more due to increasing economic participation than to the direct 
social or political organising we observed in the earlier study. For example, 
there is evidence that NGO loans to women for small-scale business such 
as cow rearing and milk production and marketing have been beneficial. 
New income and skills from training opportunities have led to more respect 
and decision making power within the household (from focus groups). 
On the other hand, women elected to the UPs or UPZ report that they are 
often marginalised when these bodies meet. They have to fight very hard for 
a share of  any resources on offer that they can control to establish projects, 
or to distribute as benefits. It is also striking that economic empowerment is 
taking precedence over political empowerment among youth. Young people 
are less wedded to the ‘government job mind set’. Instead they are realising 
that they will have to build opportunities and learn skills beyond school and 
college (such as the graduates we talked to working in the Faridpur town 
hotel sector looking to work in the business/services sector). Many younger 
people want to move away from the farming and find new ways to earn a 
living.
action to address local problems, such as land rights, often assisted by 
more powerful supportive patrons (such as journalists or lawyers).
We found that people attempting to engage with the local power 
structure give strong emphasis to the importance of  jogajog (‘connection’). In 
this perspective, a person is seen to be able to get something done because he 
or she is ‘so and so’s person’, and conversely that a person’s progress is likely 
to be blocked if  they are not so and so’s person and therefore lack the power 
of  connection. Resource-based patron client relationships structure the flow 
of  resources and condition the responses (or not) of  people with power to 
people’s problems.36 Intermediaries are also very important because they 
can help to facilitate such connections. 
These types of  relationship extend to the activities carried on within 
UP and Ward structures, as we have seen in the study. Connections are 
used to access forms of  social protection, and within the UP to control and 
distribute development resources. 
 
It is important to continue to support efforts to decentralise local 
government decision making through the UPs and the Wards but these 
types of  informal relationships need to be recognised in efforts to improve 
popular representation and build fairer resource allocation. This can only 
be done incrementally and by recognising the importance of  informal roles 
and finding ways to harness them in more positive ways. 
As Hasan et al (2015) write: ‘There is no silver bullet. These solutions 
depend on empowering local actors to establish justice in their communities, 
and to stand up against these interests. This will only come about through 
a sustainable social movement led by an enlightened political vision …’ 
(p.88). There is a politics within the messy spaces of  ‘political society’ in 
which people with relatively little power attempts to struggle, contest and 
negotiate. But aside from the cases of  small scale local short-term collective 
action described here (journalists, action groups, vigilantes) our findings 
point to little yet in the way of  sustainable progressive social movements or 
emerging vertical alliances that can challenge power brokers, or provide a 
different political vision of  the kind these authors suggest.
36  The practice of  jogajog kora (soliciting friendship) pursued by bureaucrats and 
entrepreneurs seeking to harness the power of  the informal sector is noted in Bear’s 
(2016) work in India, where it governs access to an informal zone of  influence and 
contributes to the formation of  unequal power relationships.
CH 4 • DISCUSSION 9392 CH 4 • DISCUSSION
We also found limited outcomes from efforts to strengthen the role of  
Ward sabha meetings as a local level forum for problem identification and 
participatory budgeting. This confirms the Government mid-term review 
of  the UPGP and UZGP programmes that found problems with ‘systemic 
issues such as ambiguous division of  roles and responsibilities and parallel 
management structures between the political and executive branches and 
tiers of  government’ (p.7). UZPs were particularly hampered by tension 
between administrative and political personnel, and UPs had continuing 
weak capacity and few resources. At Ward sabha level, our evidence 
confirmed that participatory meetings intended to identify local needs were 
mainly unproductive since there were few resources available for them to 
work with. UPs are weaker because whatever funds do reach them are 
increasingly subject to personal negotiation and lobbying, and not to the 
formal accountability processes set out as their roles and responsibilities. 
Ongoing UP capacity building efforts will need to better address this 
political reality.
Women’s presence and visibility in UP and other decision-making 
forums is undoubtedly increasing, but not necessarily their effectiveness. In 
the peri-urban poor women focus group, for example, we heard a positive 
account of  the newly introduced UPZ Women’s Development Forum as 
a space for increasing voice. However, the overall picture is very mixed. 
Women UP members say they are rarely given PICs to chair, and have few 
incentives to participate in UP meetings since they know they are unlikely 
to be given responsibilities for projects, or for the distribution of  resources. 
They are often marginalised, with decisions made mainly by MP or by 
male UP staff. The view of  one female focus group member that the power 
structure is associated only with men continues to be true. In small ways 
patriarchal norms are being challenged – but we learned that if  women are 
too talkative in the meetings they are marginalised further - so they have to 
work carefully. The gender dynamics in Ward sabha meetings also restricts 
the space for women’s participation. But overall, there seem to be more 
women in more formal meetings, which is good news. 
4.5 Union and Ward relationships with local informal institutions
The main informal institution relevant to the local power structure, 
as we have seen, is that of  patronage. When it comes to informal civil 
society institutions, we found that a resilient (though shifting) set of  
patronage relations remains at the heart of  UP and Ward level activities. 
There were some cases of  poor people taking small-scale collective 
from the attack on the UO in the slum. However, we did not find evidence 
of  extremist political activity in our study areas.
The bypassing of  local government structures has both positive and 
negative implications for poor people. For example, informal decision-
making may be useful for the overcoming of  political or bureaucratic hurdles, 
but in other contexts it may be coercive, extractive or exclusionary. The 
appointment of  informal AL ‘coordinators’ to oversee local development 
and maintenance projects may lead to further opportunities for corruption in 
which public resources are used for private gain. But the informal division of  
available ‘safety net’ entitlements (such as VGD cards) between the UP and 
local party leaders to distribute to followers may also widen the distribution 
of  such goods and services by serving more than one patronage network. 
Supporters of  government suggest that such by-passing and informality 
are often in the interest of  the people. In the case of  the urban slum field 
site in particular, where there was evidence that the creation of  the informal 
Unit Office structure had largely positive impacts on peoples’ access to 
services and improving dispute settlement and law and order, such claims 
cannot be easily dismissed. The recent creation of  the Motorised Rickshaw 
Association in the peri-urban village is a good example of  this ambiguity in 
the context of  civil society institutions and government rules - it facilitates 
the use of  the new motorised technology that is not yet recognised by the 
formal licensing system, and improves livelihoods, but it is also an instrument 
of  ruling party patronage and control. 
In a situation where political competition is mainly structured by 
informality and patronage, competition remains limited. The gap left by 
opposition political parties and by formal civil society actors is a cause for 
concern because it leaves ordinary people with few proper opportunities for 
representing their interests politically. It also brings the threat of  factional 
instability and even violence, as was observed during the UP elections and 
from time to time in the slum. On the other hand, increased intra-AL 
factionalism between official and unofficial candidates and may open up a 
wider set of  political choices and allegiances and perhaps the emergence of  
new political parties. But there is a continuing concern about the political 
vacuum that remains justified.  
More positively, our data suggests political extremism and religious 
tensions in both the Greater Faridpur and the urban Dhaka study 
area were lower than some recent literature might lead us to expect. 
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Finally, studies of  local and national power such as Hasan et al (2015) 
emphasise the power of  mastan brokers who serve as both facilitators and 
obstacles to processes of  pro-poor local governance. Such intermediaries 
have multiple roles, spanning ‘party activist’ to local thug or gang leader, 
often combining creative problem solving on the one hand (including 
forms of  political, economic and welfare entrepreneurship) with violent or 
criminal activities on the other. We found less influence from mastans than 
work from other areas of  Bangladesh might lead us to expect. It was not a 
term that was much used by any of  our respondents in the fieldwork in the 
three villages or the slum. Our findings support the important role played 
by brokers and intermediaries in governing access to information, resources 
and opportunities, but suggests that the role of  mastans may be overplayed, at 
least if  these are seen as distinct from local political party activists.37 
4.6 Local power and the wider ‘political game’
The extension of  the ruling party’s influence means that local power 
relations in each of  our locations have been further incorporated into 
the wider ‘political game’. The use of  informality is a key tool for this 
incorporation. If  there is an elected official in place who is inconveniently 
from the opposition party, we saw how they can be ‘worked around’ by 
creating an informal new ‘coordinator role’, or by appealing to a prior 
kinship or patron-client relationship. In the same way, key local civil 
society organizations such as Business Associations are being co-opted 
and controlled by placing politically affiliated individuals in charge. 
This co-option is not new, and was a phenomenon observed in our 
earlier study, but has now become more pronounced. 
One result is that local political competition has been reduced since the 
earlier study. This is a cause for concern not only because it leaves people 
with fewer opportunities to represent their interests, but also because of  fears 
that the opposition vacuum could be filled in the future by non-democratic 
political forces and/or religious extremists. It also makes less likely the 
possibility that future new independently minded local political leaders could 
emerge from civil society. Political competition is instead increasingly being 
expressed through growing local factionalism within ruling party, evident 
from the tensions between MP and UPZ/UP levels in the peri-urban site, or 
37  This confirms recent work by Jackman (2017) that finds that the role of  the mastan was 
disappearing in a Dhaka slum, replaced instead by a local power structure more directly 
enforced through the ruling AL party. 
increasingly inclusive local institution. For example, there were some 
examples of  poor people - including women - using it to further their 
rights and interests. Today we observed less interaction between UP Chairs 
and other local civil society leaders, fewer resources for UPs to distribute 
themselves, and despite the Ward shabha system, in practice there are more 
restrictions on planning local work accountably (such as the change to PICs 
noted below).
Capacity building support to UPs and UPZs has not significantly 
enhanced their capacity to raise revenue locally, despite the more buoyant 
local economy in three of  our four study areas. Only in the slum area is 
there an effort to raise new local taxes - albeit informally - in an attempt to 
improve local services, and we found this to have been generally positively 
received. For example, there is some evidence that informal taxes raised by 
the Unit Office are contributing to improved refuse collection services, but 
there were also a few complaints about their imposed nature and the steep 
increase in cost.
The UPZ sub-district level remains weak and there are fewer resources 
available for allocation at the sub-district level. We found little evidence that 
the recent reform that requires two female UPZ Vice Chairs was making much 
of  a difference. The woman member given this responsibility reported that in 
practice she still found herself  operating in a male-dominated environment, 
where her voice was neither encouraged nor heard. This confirms the general 
findings from Hossain and Akhter’s (2011) earlier research.
More optimistically, the buoyant local economy nevertheless does suggest 
indicate untapped potential for securing higher levels of  local revenue 
collection that could boost UP access to resources for local development.
4.8 Central resource allocation and political interest
When it comes to accessing resources locally, the main site for patronage 
is the implementation of  local government development projects, which 
are increasingly funded by central government resources. Resources are 
transferred to local areas through the local level offices of  the twenty-nine 
different line ministries, or as is increasingly the case, via the local MPs 
(who increasingly control large public funds to use for purposes that are 
specifically approved by them alone). This is not to say that the use of  these 
resources may not sometimes be locally guided, but when this happens it 
tends to do so within the overall framework of  party politics. 
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For example, Khan and Stidsen (2014)’s SDC study found that 
‘fundamentalist Islamic mobilization is on the increase in all regions, and that 
the Government is increasing its hegemony through oppression of  critical 
forces (close monitoring of  non-government actors; court cases, arrests and 
killings of  political opponents)’.38 Our findings suggest that although there 
is a ‘squeeze’ as the ruling party extends its power, their other conclusions 
around conflict in our areas are not confirmed: law and order has generally 
improved, there are little or no reports of  religious or majority/minority 
tensions in either the rural or the urban slum locations.
In the longer term, it is difficult to predict whether progress with 
decentralization and local accountability may be strengthened or put 
at risk if  the dominance of  the ruling party continues.
4.7 Local resource mobilization for local development
We found that there were some positive impacts from capacity building 
efforts undertaken with formal local government institutions, but compared 
with the optimism of  the earlier study these were disappointing. For 
example, while the UP’s role as a Union Information Centre provides an 
accessible certification service for local citizens, but inclusivity within Ward 
level planning processes remains more limited. This may be closer to the 
current government’s plans for the type of  decentralization it has in mind 
for the UPs – i.e. as ‘deconcentrated’ units for service provision, rather than 
as ‘devolved’ units of  power and local democracy. But the provision of  
information services is important as it may be seen to increase the legitimacy 
and relevance of  the UP. 
We find little evidence of  increased local resource mobilization that 
could drive local level decision-making and fund local projects. Instead, 
an increasing proportion of  resources for local development arrive locally 
through the personal channel of  the MP and the ruling party. Our 2004 
data had suggested that the UP was slowly growing in significance as an 
38  Their findings were based on data from Khulna, Rajshahi and Sylhet Divisions in 
relation to five ‘conflict-prone domains’: (a) Gender relations in domestic and public 
space, workplaces and political platforms; (b) Local politics in terms of  party-political 
dynamics in and around local bodies; (c) Local governance in local administration 
and distribution of  public services, and interplay between elected bodies, MPs and 
administration, (d) Dynamics of  exclusion – the processes through which groups or 
individuals are deprived of  resources or opportunities, (e) Local economic dynamics for 
small producers and small traders, and poor people’s access to natural resources.
4.9 Local initiatives for development
These processes are impacting on local development in various ways. 
In Greater Faridpur, improved economic opportunities have been mainly 
driven by migration and small business development, supported by 
appropriate government and non-governmental services in the form of  
advice, training, and loans. Whereas small scale trading was the main form 
of  local business before, there is now a more expanded landscape of  local 
industries around jute mills, poultry, and brickfields. This has created new 
jobs with backwards linkages that feed into the informal local economy. In 
the Dhaka slum area, the growth of  the garment industry has mainly driven 
local employment, along with the demand for domestic work among the 
urban middle classes.  
As we have seen, development resources are mostly still coming from the 
centre, particularly in the three Greater Faridpur sites, rather than being 
raised locally at UP level through taxes. Local resources too are still mobilised 
in ways that still allow ordinary people relatively little influence or control 
over decisions. In the slum community, by contrast, local development 
activity has more of  a ‘bottom up’ character, since there are CBOs formed 
by and working with the urban NGOs to improve access to and quality of  
local services such as water and sanitation.
Some areas of  progressive social change have nevertheless been driven 
by government initiatives and NGO efforts. In particular, there have been 
some small gains for disabled people in terms of  recognition and welfare 
benefits (an outcome in which civil society groups at the international level 
have also helped to achieve). At the same time the disability focus remains 
primarily at the level of  the idea of  entitlements rather than rights. 
As we have seen, the gendered implications of  local change processes 
remain incremental, complex and contradictory. There are small gains 
around women’s inclusion on local committee panels, and the observed 
NGO support to women through credit and support for small business 
development are positive, but there is far less evidence of  rights-based work 
than before. There is no doubt however that particularly in the slum and 
in the well-connected study site, women’s economic participation is higher 
than ever before. This overall context can be seen to offer a test case for the 
power of  markets and economic forms of  NGO support to contribute to 
women’s empowerment.
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Central resource allocation has therefore become more subject to 
political interests and capture. The stronger role of  the MP and the greater 
influence of  the ruling party has in some respects ‘recentralised’ local 
decision making pressures. For example, as we have seen, there has been an 
expansion of  the provision of  social welfare/safety net initiatives in since 
our last study. New forms of  social protection have joined long-established 
welfare services such as the VGD/VGF, Test Relief, old age pension, 
and the widow pension. These new benefits are provided and allocated 
through the UP system and include the 40 Days employment programme, 
the disability allowance, and the maternity allowance for poor mothers. 
A higher proportion of  these are now subject to allocation by the MP 
and local political party activists than before.
Political interests have impacted on other areas too. Few of  the UP 
Standing Committees that had played key roles in local planning local 
development planning and implementation processes last time remain 
active. Our findings therefore confirm Saber et al’s (2009) study that found: 
‘meetings are irregular, responsibilities little understood and few of  the 
required Standing Committees actually formed’. Our findings too support 
Sowdagar’s (2010) USAID study that reported that local people say that 
they would prefer a locally-elected representative system in the Districts 
and sub-Districts because this might ‘make it possible for the government 
to respond to the diversity of  conditions that prevail in different parts of  the 
country’ (p.30). 
We also found that there had been a politically motivated change of  rules 
regarding PICs in the implementation of  UP level local development and 
maintenance work. The PIC can now be convened without the participation 
of  a UP member as the PIC chair as was previously the case. Such a change 
reduces the public accountability of  local projects, and it means that no 
official may easily be held responsible if  something goes wrong. However, 
one type of  central resource flow that is less vulnerable to patronage or 
political diversion is the relatively small amount of  directly-transferred 
donor funding that is provided as LGSP support for convening Ward level 
planning meetings and UP level training. 
Overall, it was found that contexts varied: there is the possibility of  
improved services and user voice through party networks (as in the slum), 
but that in many cases people also face a reduction of  service provider 
choice overall as range of  available patrons contracts.
provide a different, and more pessimistic scenario. But they have sometimes 
occurred in the past. 
There is some evidence of  positive change in relation to the profile of  
disability rights, which are more visible in public discourse than we had 
observed in 2004. We found a higher profile than last time in our study sites 
for the rights of  disabled people, though this was mainly expressed through 
claims on welfare benefits rather than that of  broader social change. There 
are also increased resource flows in the form of  provision of  new social safety 
net entitlements around disability. This is an example of  both government 
and civil society action and in many ways an outcome of  longstanding 
NGO campaigning, with international support, to put pressure on the 
government to take disability more seriously. But our evidence suggests 
that the gains observed, though very welcome, are more welfare-oriented 
than rights-based in substance. The future may be an unbalanced one in 
which state and private sector institutions dominate, but where there is little 
independent civil society or ‘not for profit’ activity.
4.11 Implications of shrinking civil society space
In our earlier study we found a civil society had been relatively diverse, 
and occasionally politically focused, with power to sometimes influence local 
officials, and in some cases to secure land rights for households. Today rights-
based development work that addressed structural inequalities has faded, to 
be replaced by smaller scale and niche-based activities such as legal aid. 
The idea that civil society space may be shrinking can be understood in 
several ways. At one level, a pluralistic civil society continues to be diminished 
by the dominance of  market based development activities rather than 
rights-based and social mobilisation approaches. Yet this area of  civil society 
- business support, migration loans - appears to be thriving. However, NGOs 
are increasingly providing support to non-poor categories of  borrower, and 
there is perhaps less emphasis today on offering micro-level loans for the 
poorest. At another level, this trend can be understood as a continuing 
narrowing of  democratic civil society space by increasingly authoritarian 
acts of  government power and by action taken against dissenting voices.
The decline of  rights-based development NGOs is the result of  many 
factors, including tensions with government, internal organizational problems, 
practical difficulties with local mobilization approaches, and changing donor 
support trends. Their relative absence – at least in the Greater Faridpur sites 
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4.10 Poor peoples’ influence on political decision making and  
improving services
While people may be better off economically, opportunities to participate in 
decision-making and to shape service provision have been slower to grow. 
The anticipated progress towards citizens who are ‘makers and shapers’ 
of  service provision as opposed to being merely ‘users and choosers’ (in 
Cornwall and Gaventa’s 2001’s terms) has not taken place. Deeper forms 
of  participation and voice remain a distant prospect for most poor people, 
and women in particular.39 There may be more choice in these communities, 
but there is also less voice as civil society space contracts. The exception is 
the example of  community-based organizations in the slum, which have 
succeeded in driving improvements to services but they are also compromised 
by disproportionately reflecting the interests of  better-offer slum dwellers. 
Here there is a longer history of  active, women-centred CBOs operating 
than in the other study areas, helping to support local improvements. But 
these too are increasingly subject to hierarchy and incorporation into ruling 
party networks.
One overall factor that constrains progress is the reversal of  the signs in the 
earlier study that civil society was starting to play a role in decentralization. 
Evidence from studies elsewhere suggests this could be important. 
For example, in Bolivia, important gains arose from the decentralization 
process due to inclusion of  civil society in local governance processes within 
‘oversight committees’ (Faguet 2011). The quality of  local decentralized 
decision-making was also improved by interaction with civil society 
and business groups. Political competition, central to the argument that 
democratic governance can be strengthened by decentralisation, also 
improved when new local political leaders with effective skills emerged from 
civil society groups and moved into local politics. More inclusive associations 
and committees can provide non-party political forms of  competition that 
increase the participation of  women and other marginalised groups in local 
decision making.40 These conditions are not presently visible in Bangladesh, 
where pervasive patron-client relationships and an increasing single political 
party monopoly on both formal politics and associational/committee life 
39  See Cornwall and Gaventa’s (2001) useful distinction, which we drew upon in the earlier 
study.
40  However, Hossain and Akhter (2011) advise caution around assuming that civil society 
experience necessarily prepares women for local government participation, since in 
Bangladesh ‘civil society actors are not believed to have a good understanding of  the 
UZP system’ (p.3). 
more likely to be by-passed by the MP. For example, protests by NGOs 
against extra-judicial killings are less common locally than they were. If  civil 
society activists raise their voices they say they fear problems from the local 
AL leaders.
Finally, shrinking civil society space could perhaps also be understood in 
less negative terms. From the government’s perspective there is value in ‘co-
opting’ activist civil society groups into a more unitary and coherent official 
‘project’ for local modernisation and development. With the nation heading 
towards middle-income status the government is seeking to build a more stable 
elected single party government. Nor is it the case that all civil society groups 
are fully co-opted. Some organizations are attempting to build strategic links 
with the AL on their own terms in order to access resources and maintain some 
room for manoeuvre without necessarily fully buying into the government’s 
view. This may or may not turn out to be a productive strategy. Yet as formal 
rights based civil society actors are squeezed, with the risk that informal and/
or ‘unruly’ civil society is the main context for opposition.
4.12 Prospects for change for poor people and gender equality
Some observers characterise Bangladesh’s changing power structure 
in terms of  a gradual transition from so-called traditional structures 
towards a set of  new relationships and institutions. The actual picture 
is more complex. The assimilation of  new political actors into the older 
power structure is just as possible as the transformation of  the old one. 
Elements of  the existing power structure, such as patron-client 
relationships, are continuing to evolve, adapt and take on new forms. 
Not is change necessarily linear. Patterns of  change that we thought would 
be continuing trends, such as the growing centrality of  the UP, and the 
productive interactions we observed between local government and NGOs, 
have now gone into reverse. The main constant is the continuing high 
level of  national and local economic growth and this is the main source of  
optimism among people for the future.
Gender issues are a central theme in our study of  how people try to 
engage with the power structure in pursuit of  their interests. Our data 
suggests there are small ways in which the power structure is becoming more 
gender inclusive, through the creation of  new local government spaces, and 
as a result of  women’s greater economic participation. Women’s agency is 
increasing both at the level of  household decision-making, and through small 
but growing levels of  participation within official government bodies such 
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– raises short-term problems for poor people seeking to advance their rights, 
as well as potential longer-term problems for progress with decentralization 
and local accountability. However, rights-based informal civil society action 
is still apparent in some of  our Greater Faridpur data, such as local journalist 
groups helping with local protests. The situation was also slightly different, 
however, in the urban slum area. Here, we found NGOs that had moved from 
earlier credit-based approaches to also undertake sustained local organising 
for improving access to services.
Before, we found that when NGOs and local authorities worked 
together through productive coalitions or partnership arrangements there 
were sometimes positive outcomes for poorer people. Today there is less 
countervailing pressure from civil society visible on issues such as extra-
judicial killings, because to do so would risk friction with local AL leaders. 
Nevertheless, the possibility remains that the government’s strategy of  
building a co-opted civil society into a unified national development 
approach is one that may yet bring stable and inclusive economic growth, 
even if  this is achieved at a political cost. The cost however could be high, as 
we argue the power structure has become brittle rather than resilient.
There is also less civil society pressure to hold government to account on 
the implementation of  progressive laws. This is apparent in relation to child 
marriage, for example. Efforts to address the problem of  early marriage 
through stronger implementation of  laws and through raising community 
awareness may however be circumvented locally, except in cases where 
such marriages are seen illicit. For example, we learned that the marriage 
registrar in the WCV was prepared to marry under-age women if  they 
promised to return to get their certificates once they were over 18. But the 
official narrative around women’s rights is still mainly one that focuses on 
protecting ‘our women’ (controlling unsanctioned relationships, protecting 
from harassment) rather than one that puts women’s rights and agency at 
the centre.
Another important and concerning implication of  shrinking civil 
society space relates to decentralisation, as discussed in the previous section. 
A weak activist civil society could damage progress with decentralisation 
and democratisation. The types of  win-win negotiations we found in 2004 
taking place between activist NGOs and local UP level leadership – around 
land rights for example – were contributing to the growing relevance of  the 
UP as a legitimate site for governing local communities. Today, we find it 
subject to fewer countervailing pressure from civil society of  business and 
Nor did we find evidence that the currently thriving private sector is 
impacting upon either social or political development in positive ways 
beyond the obviously important role of  creating employment for growing 
numbers of  people. Instead, the ruling party is co-opting the private 
sector and civil society into a new consolidated and politicised local power 
structure that is at the service of  the AL’s national development plan. 
Our data therefore supports the idea that things are hanging in the balance. 
Business associations are not playing a broader civil society role: they 
remain focused on self-interest, such as paying lower market lease fees, and 
predominantly male-dominated. Only occasionally are interests asserted to 
create public benefit (such as improved security in bazar areas). For example, 
political rent seeking on the bus businesses in Faridpur town has led to 
regular strikes. These are temporarily resolved when the Minister is brought 
in to negotiate and the local party is made to back off.
As we have seen, there was some evidence that independent media 
is playing a positive role. It is also becoming more diverse and playing 
new roles supporting new economic initiatives. For example, along with 
traditional print media, there are now growing numbers of  TV networks 
providing useful new information and examples of  good practice around 
new agricultural business opportunities such as milk production. Journalists 
groups are also playing active roles in campaigning around transparency, 
rights and accountability issues. There is perhaps a link between central 
government efforts to restrict certain critical media outlets at national level 
(such as the Prothom Alo and Daily Star) and the local media activists who 
challenge rights infringements (such as those driven by the MP’s faction in 
the peri-urban area). Press clubs and associations remain sites of  relatively 
independent civil society space and it is certainly difficult to turn back the 
growth of  more diverse and independent media in the country.  
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as local level committees and shalish dispute settlement systems. We heard 
from our informants that this participation is perceived as being driven by 
both the messages from NGO campaigns around equal opportunities and 
rights under the law, and also through women’s growing participation in 
household income generation activities.
In the slum study site in particular, women’s efforts are central to the 
struggle for tenure rights, better workplace conditions, and local services in 
ways challenge patriarchal norms. However, the problem we have identified 
in the study of  declining civil society space provides poses problems for 
progress with gender equality, particularly in relation to the Greater Faridpur 
sites. There is evidence that the types of  radical civil society organizations 
that we found in the earlier study but which are less present today may have 
negative implications for the rights of  both women and men in relation to 
struggles over power. As Kabeer (2011) the community based organisations 
or grassroots groups formed by such radical NGOs are one of  the ‘vantage 
points’ that make it possible for both women and men to reflect upon and 
positively challenge the ‘gendered social order’ (Kabeer 2011, p.525).
Feruci and Parnini (2014) suggest there is an ongoing struggle between 
‘traditional power holders and the new players’ with the potential to contribute 
positively to future change: (i) private sector organisations may gain interests 
that go beyond purely economic objectives; (ii) growing numbers of  urban 
youth may increasingly place economic opportunities above partisan politics 
and value more civic participation and inclusion in decision-making; and (iii) 
a media sector that is becoming more diverse and independent. 
We would perhaps not wish to characterise the situation in terms 
of  a binary between traditional and new actors and relationships, 
and see the situation as more complex and fluid, but we agree on the 
potential importance of  emerging new business, media, and youth roles. 
We found so far little evidence of  organised progressive activity by youth, 
though some young people told us they were unexcited by the idea of  a 
traditional education as the route to an old-style government job, and were 
beginning to think more creatively about actively pursuing other more 
entrepreneurial opportunities – such as learning new skills and setting up a 
business. There was previously a youth club in the well-connected village, 
but now people say they have no time to put into it. Concerns around 
inter-generational tensions were voiced in both the Greater Faridpur and 
the urban slum communities, but nor more than might be expected in 
populations undergoing rapid growth and change. 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.1 Change and continuity in the local power structure
Our earlier study had reported a cautiously optimistic picture of  a slowly 
changing local power structure in Greater Faridpur. We identified small but 
potentially significant ways that new institutional spaces were opening up that 
made it possible for some poor women and men to improve their situations. 
These opportunities centred on improvements to the functioning of  local 
government structures, the evolving inclusivity of  some local institutions, 
and forms of  civil society action and coalition building that sometimes 
produced ‘win-win’ outcomes for both poor and non-poor people. Today, 
while we note that there has been positive economic change experienced 
by most people in the communities we visited (although the remote village 
continues to be marginalised), we are less optimistic about recent ways in 
which the power structure has been changing. 
The new study documents both continuity and change. Economic 
dynamism has intensified since the mid-2000s, resulting in improved 
livelihoods for many people. Women’s market participation has increased 
as many continue to access new economic opportunities (often with the 
support of  NGOs). Communities are more geographically and socially 
connected than before, and households have greater choice in the range and 
type of  connections they seek to form. Local, national, and transnational 
communications and migration opportunities have increased. Progress with 
achieving women’s political inclusion into local institutions is occurring, 
albeit at a slow rate. Elements of  an older power structure remain, with 
the persistence of  patron-client relations, elite clan politics and patriarchal 
norms, but these are slowly changing. The range of  patrons people can 
access has continued to widen, increasing opportunities for those with less 
power to pursue more favourable forms of  connection. Within the power 
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5.2 The continuing importance of studying local power
In a context where forms of  personalised patron-client relationship continue 
to dominate, and civil society space is diminished, people continue to face 
serious obstacles in their efforts to further their social and political goals As 
World Development Report 2017 (World Bank, 2017) reminds us, understanding 
how the local power structure works, and how it is perceived, continues 
to be important themes for mainstream development policy and practice. 
Power asymmetries contribute to exclusion, inequality and restrict equitable 
growth. As a result, there is a continuing need for policy makers and 
development agencies to prioritise support for civic engagement, coalition-
building and forms of  bargaining that can take better account of  the needs 
of  those people excluded from growth, and whose interests continue to be at 
risk of  capture by elites who seek to maintain the status quo. 
Our re-study found levels of  coalition building between local government 
leader and civil society groups to be lower than those we encountered in 
2004. Although there are some reforms in place that have been designed to 
increase levels of  civic engagement it is not easy to find evidence that these 
are working. Our most concerning finding is the decline of  the UP’s role 
and position as the crucial lowest institution of  local government, a change 
that brings negative implications for poor people’s participation in decision 
making, joint government and civil society pro-poor coalition building, and 
increased local resource mobilisation. The implications of  these should not 
be seen as a purely technical problem, but it does support WDR 2017’s 
insistence that we need to think beyond technical ‘capacity building’ of  
local institutions to engage more fully with power issues in supporting more 
inclusive growth.
Our analysis suggests a more brittle local power structure than we 
encountered during the mid-2000s. Today there is less resilience in the 
system in two senses: (i) an increasing concentration of  power within a single 
political party patronage framework could fracture if  subjected to future 
unpredictable pressure or shocks; and (ii) for poorer people in particular, 
the risk of  falling foul of  the ruling party’s patronage will have serious 
consequences, since there may be fewer alternative non-affiliated patrons 
available. Another element in this analysis is the possibility that while 
extensive, the social protection system is particularly vulnerable to political 
capture at the local level. Finally, there is a pressing need to protect those 
people who are left behind within the overall picture of  positive growth, 
such as those in marginal locations and those with marginal identities, and 
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structure, the blurring of  formal and informal roles and relationships 
has also continued, creating a complex ‘web’ of  relationships that both 
limits participation and civic engagement but nevertheless offers up some 
opportunities for incremental inclusive change.
What is different today? Civil society space has become reduced, 
particularly that formerly occupied by radical NGOs and civil society 
groups addressing local rights-based development in relation to land, local 
political participation and civic engagement. As a result, there are fewer 
opportunities for the types of  win-win coalitions we had identified and 
predicted would become more frequent in the earlier study. Local Business 
Associations, School Committees and other local civil society groupings 
are to a higher degree than before captured by political interests. 
This means that while there is a wider range of  patron available (for example 
local media supported activism), opportunities for poorer people to build 
horizontal forms of  solidarity remain limited. Connected to this trend, local 
level political competition has also diminished as the ruling political party 
has consolidated its control of  local power structure and weakened any 
formal political opposition. The forms of  political competition that do take 
place are now primarily expressed through increasing factionalism at local 
level within the ruling party. 
The combination of  stronger local livelihoods and reduced 
democratic space is producing mixed outcomes for poor men and women. 
Undoubtedly, the government is delivering increased prosperity and 
a degree of  stability. Economic growth makes people more optimistic 
about the future, particularly younger people. There are small gains 
specifically for women in both the economic and the local government 
decision-making spheres, even though many constraints remain. 
There are encouraging signs that informal civil society action remains 
vigorous, from local activist journalism to community-level vigilantism, along 
with other forms of  ‘rude accountability’ in which confront abuses by those 
with power and attempt to strengthen the rights of  the marginalised. But the 
overall picture of  economic gain has not come without cost, which takes the 
form of  ‘political pain’. The formal power structure may be becoming more 
fragile, brittle and less resilient than before. The ruling party’s increasing 
dominance within the networks that connect people with less power to those 
with more power contributes to this vulnerability.
so far been able to argue that economic growth takes precedence over the 
types of  concerns about people’s relationships with the local power structure 
that we discuss in this report. Economic gain may currently be taking place 
with levels of  political pain that has not yet been particularly severe, but 
these could become more acute in the future if  these problems are not fully 
addressed.
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to enhance efforts to advance inclusion for women who face continuing 
marginalization within formal governance structures.
5.3 Facing the future
Our earlier study concluded with four practical insights for governmental 
and non-governmental agencies seeking to support pro-poor change 
in Bangladesh: the need to (i) recognise the importance of  economic 
development as a solid foundation for progressive change; (ii) find ways of  
supporting local government and civil society jointly; (iii) understand and 
build upon local difference to avoid ‘one size fits all’ support strategies; and 
(iv) continue to identify new opportunities to support pro-poor coalitions 
involving local elites. 
In the case of  (i), economic growth is now front and centre in mainstream 
development policy, but we cannot afford for this to be at the expense 
of  diversity, inclusion, and civil society action. The continuing value of  
economic growth to improving livelihoods is clear, but ‘inclusive growth’ 
remains a challenging goal. Our analysis highlights the risk that economic 
gain displaces issues of  inclusivity, participation and rights (political pain). 
In the case of  (ii), supporting local government and civil society in mutually 
reinforcing ways remains paramount. But it has become more difficult 
today, given the decline of  rights-based civil society actors such as NGOs. 
The presence of  types of  informal civil society and the persistence of  forms 
of  ‘rude accountability’ nevertheless provide some cause for optimism in 
this regard. With (iii), we still argue there is a need to avoid ‘one size fits all’ 
approaches and that it is vital to pay close attention to difference. People in the 
remote location are made more vulnerable by environmental vulnerability 
and poor infrastructure. Our data also suggests the need to continue to treat 
with caution generalizations about what is happening in Bangladesh, such 
as those commonly made in relation to extremism, intolerance and religious 
tensions. Finally, (iv), the need to find ways to support pro-poor coalitions 
involving local elites remains, even though we found fewer cases of  NGOs 
working constructively with local officials and informal power holders to 
solve local problems. The media’s role in assisting the poor to challenge 
infringements of  their rights by more powerful interest groups and build 
such coalitions may be increasing.
No one yet knows what will fill the vacuum left by a weakened political 
opposition – a new democratic politics, increased levels of  factionalism and 
instability, or more sinister forms of  extremist politics. The government has 
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Glossary
Awami League (AL)   the ruling political party (headed by Sheikh  
Hasina Wajid)
Bangladesh National the main opposition party (headed by  
Party (BNP)  Khaleda Zia)
Bazar  market place
Burqa  a full body garment worn by some Muslim women




Gram sarkar  ‘village government’ (now abolished)
Gusti  patrilineage clan
Hat  weekly or bi-weekly market
Imam  mosque leader who conducts the prayers
Jama’at  congregation of  worshippers (Muslim)
Jatiya party  Political party set up by former military ruler 
General H.M. Ershad
Jogajog connection
Kabikha  food for work
Khas land   land reserved for redistribution to landless 
households
Lakh  one hundred thousand
Madrasa  Muslim religious school
Matbar  informal village leader or ‘elder’
Mastan  broker, criminal intermediary, gangster
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Acronyms
ADP   Annual Development Plan
ADR   Alternative dispute resolution
BRAC   A leading Bangladeshi development NGO  
(no longer an acronym)
CBO  Community based organisation
CSO   Civil society organization
DC   Deputy Commissioner
DDLG   Deputy Director, Local Government
DSK  Dushtha Shasthya Kendra, an NGO
EWR   Elected Women Representatives
LGRDC   Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives
LGSP   Local Governance Support Project
MOFDM  Ministry of  Food & Disaster Management
MP   Member of  Parliament
NDCC  North Dhaka City Corporation
NGO   Non-Governmental Organization
NWDP   National Women Development Policy
PBSP   Purbo Bangla Sharbohara Party 
PMU   Project Management Unit
PPP   Public-Private Partnership
PSC   Project Steering Committee
TR   Test Relief  (a food for work programme  
under MOFDM)
UISC   Union Information and Service Centre
UNO   Upazila Nirbahi Officer
UP   Union Parishad
UPGP   Union Parishad Governance Project
UZP   Upazila Parishad
UZGP   Upazila Parishad Governance Project
VGF  Vulnerable group feeding
VDG  Vulnerable group development
WDF   Women’s Development Forum
WS   Ward sabha (council)
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Para  neighbourhood of  village
Parishad  council
Poti  congregation (Hindu)
Paurashava  municipality
Quomi type of  independent madrasa, lit. ‘community’
Sadar upazila  main administrative centre of  the district
Shalish   traditional mechanism for village dispute 
settlement, less formal than the village courts
Samaj   religious community, brotherhood which helps to 
structure local village societal organization (also 
more generally ‘society’)
Taka (Tk) currency (US$1 is approx. Tk80)
Union  the lowest level of  local government
Union parishad  union council
Upazila  sub-district
Upazila Nirbahi  sub-District Coordination Officer 
Officer
Upazila parishad  sub-district council
Ward Sabha ward council
Zila  district
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Terms of reference
Objective and scope
The main objective of  the restudy is to identify, analyse and describe formal 
and informal political, social and economic drivers of  change in comparison 
with the original study. The scope and outline of  the restudy should to a 
high degree remain comparable to the original study with two exceptions. A 
particular focus should be placed on the integration of  a gender perspective 
throughout the study, as specified below. 
The restudy will also add a study location in an urban slum setting in 
Dhaka in addition to the revisit to the three villages in Faridpur and Rajbari 
districts. If  possible, the slum location selected chosen will include a number 
of  individuals (such as labourers, garment workers) with migration links with 
Faridpur/Rajbari in order to provide coherence across all field locations.
The overall focus should be on the union/ward and its formal and 
informal power linkages to the village/slum and Upazila/city corporation 
levels. Also linkages to structures and actors at the national level affecting the 
local level should be included.
Relevant issues to be studied:
1.  What do local power structures look like in the forms of  patron-
clientelism, social and economic relations, gender relations, as 
well as societal perceptions and the formal/informal mechanisms 
for exercise of  power locally? 
2.  Who are the main actors involved in the political and economic 
power processes of  local development? How do they relate to 
each other and how do they bond?  
3.  How do these formal and informal relationships and bonds affect 
the access to political and economic power processes of  local 
development for women and marginalized groups (including 
minorities, older people, disabled)?
4.  How do political power structures and relations at the UP/
ward level relate to the informal village/slum level institutions 
of  samaj, jama’at/poti and gusti? What, if  any, are the gendered 
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Boxes
Box 1: Normal rules do not apply: party leaders and local water rights
Box 2: Local civil society: neighbourhood watch or vigilante group?
Box 3: A local informal AL ‘coordinator’ from the local minority 
community
Box 4: International migration loans from NGOs
Box 5: Migration, gender concerns, and clan politics
Box 6: Informal civil society: media action against land grabbing
Box 7: Marginalisation of  a woman UPZ member
Box 8: ‘Informal vocational training’: migrating for tailoring work in 
Keraniganj
Box 9: UP Member Mr J.: Informality, patronage and flexible allegiances
Box 10: Informal slum governance via the Ward Commissioner’s ‘Unit 
Office’
Box 11: A female-headed garment worker household
Box 12: S.’s story – The UO, CBOs, landlords and tenants
and their relations to study are linkages between the union chairmen, ward 
councillor and union/ward members, the Members of  Parliament, the 
Upazila Nirbahi Officers, other relevant Upazila administration officers, 
district/city corporation administration officers (e.g. the ADLG, the DC at 
Upazila level and the Mayor), LGED and LCDI staff, as well as private 
business interests, NGO and CBO actors. 
There is also a need to look closer into the local activities of  NGOs, 
CBOs, Chambers of  Commerce, private sector interest groups, the local 
media, but also into the activities undertaken by the line ministries and their 
upazila level and district/city corporation administrations in sectors such as 
health, education, infrastructure, land registration and redistribution. 
Throughout the restudy, the role of  women should be highlighted, 
including a special focus on how all of  the above mentioned relations, 
dynamics and processes affect women and girls in particular. The restudy 
shall also include reflections on the scope to specifically promote gender 
equality (e.g. end practice of  child marriages, dowry and violence against 
women) with regards to findings.
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implications of  these structures and relationships?
5.  How do political power structures and relations at the UP/ward 
level relate to more formal local level institutions as the shalish, 
mosque, temple and school committees? What if  any, are the 
gendered implications of  these structures and relationships?
6.  How are local power relations played out at the union/ward and 
upazila levels interlinked with the political game at higher meso- 
and macro- levels of  the Bangladeshi society? What if  any, are 
the gendered implications of  these structures and relationships?
7.  How are taxes and other local resources collected, if  they are 
collected, and how are they planned for in the ADP budget? 
8.  How (if  so) are state allocated resources as VGD (Vulnerable 
Group Development Program) and VGF (Vulnerable Group 
Feeding) cards and the similar initiatives used by local political 
actors for further entrenchment of  their political positions?
9.  How are initiatives or social processes having an impact on 
promoting key local political processes and local development?  
What if  any, are the gendered implications of  these initiatives 
and social processes?
10.  Are there actors, processes and initiatives for strengthening of  
poor people’s (women, men, girls and boys) participation and 
influence in decision-making as well as their access to social 
services and productive resources?
11.  How does the shrinking democratic space look for civil society 
and the media? What effects if  any has this had on local power 
structure and people?
12.  What are the main trends, differences, success factors and 
obstacles for positive social and political change for poor people 
and gender equality in relation to the original study?
The restudy should identify and capture the dynamics of  the present 
situation and make a comparison with the original study through an analysis 
of  the roles and the agendas of  strategic actors (agents for change, agents 
against change), as well as structures, initiatives and processes in local 
Bangladeshi society. Main emphasis of  the restudy should be on the power 
relations played out at the union/ward and upazila levels in relation to local 
development and the annual development planning process, in particular 
related to primary education and basic health services. Important actors 

